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In 2009, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stated in
the Copenhagen Accord that “climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time”
(UNFCCC, 2009, p. 1). It is such a challenge because a massive and coordinated eort is needed
to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 2). To avoid
this, the UNFCCC aims for a temperature rise of less than 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels.
However, achieving this goal has become increasingly dicult. e physics of the climate system
are complex as is the implementation of eective solutions to tackle the growing number of social,
political, and economic problems that result from climate change. is is due to what is known as
the tragedy of the commons—a situation in which individual short-term interests are at odds with
the long-term interests of the collective (Hardin, 1968). Because it may cause nancial losses, it is
unaractive for individuals (and states) to cut back on greenhouse gas emissions to limit climate
change unless others do so. In addition, climate change is an abstract phenomenon whose causes
and eects can only be connected with the help of scientic methods, not personal experience.
All of this makes it a highly contested issue.
While responsible and constructive actors advocate—or at least accept—eective climate policies
to reach the 2°C goal, obstructive actors try to block all legislation that could possibly entail costs
and restrictions for them. In both camps there are actors as varied as governments, parliaments,
politicians, political parties, scientists, non-governmental organizations, companies, media outlets,
social movements, and individual citizens. It goes without saying that these actors have very
dierent possibilities when it comes to asserting their interests. However, most of them need the
support of the public at least sometimes (Kriesi, 2004). erefore they must inform, convince, and
mobilize the public. To this end, they have to communicate their views, arguments, critiques,
endorsements, etc. in public statements. e resulting set of statements is what is usually
considered public discourse.
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Public discourses are oen seen as national maers in political communication research as they
produce public opinion and thus serve as intermediaries between the (national) public and the
(national) government (cf. Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990; Peters, 1994). However, the bale over
climate change policies is fought not only at the national level but also in and across political
arenas at all levels (Simonis, 2017). is multi-level system of climate governance generates a
lot of public communication both at and across the dierent levels, given that actors need to be
active in multiple arenas simultaneously to defend their interests eectively and that they (at
least sometimes) require the support of the public to do so.
In addition to this practical aspect, which is important for the actors involved in climate politics,
a transnational climate discourse is also desirable for more normative reasons. First, the burdens
and responsibilities of climate change are unevenly distributed across the globe (IPCC, 2014). To
become aware of this and possibly work out a coordinated response, transnational communication
is essential. Second, exclusively national discourses are neither normatively legitimate nor
politically ecient when it comes to global issues like climate change (Fraser, 2007; Habermas,
1998). is means that if national discourses are strictly separate, not all people aected by the
changing climate can participate in the formation of public opinion. It also means that national
institutions—which would be the only ones that could be addressed by an isolated national
public—would not be able to respond eectively as the problem goes beyond their competencies. In
order to be both normatively legitimate and politically eective, public discourses on global issues
like climate change must be transnational. For this reason it is crucial that public communication
about climate change is not only studied within the “bounded ‘container[s]’ of the Westphalian
nation state” (Volkmer, 2019, p. 12) but also beyond.
Based on these considerations, I pursue three research objectives in this thesis: (1) to map how
transnational the online public discourse on the global phenomenon of climate change is, (2)
to understand the role of the (trans)nationalized online public discourses on climate change in
today’s hybrid media system, and (3) to nd, implement, and validate computational methods to
study public discourses across dierent political and language spaces. In the following sections
of this introduction, I show why these three objectives deserve our aention and how studying
them contributes to the existing literature. I also show how each of the three articles included
in the thesis help to achieve the objectives and summarize their ndings. e nal part of the
introduction is devoted to the limitations of this thesis. Building on that, I conclude by discussing
possible future research questions.
1.1 Transnationality of the online public discourse on climate
change
e web has become an essential platform for many actors when it comes to public communication.
is is because websites, blogs, and social media allow everyone the unltered distribution of
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self-made content. In contrast to traditional mass media, actors can speak for themselves on
the web. is does not mean, however, that actors necessarily get more aention when they
communicate online (Koopmans & Zimmermann, 2010), but it does mean that the web provides
them with a platform to participate in public discourse with relative ease. In addition, the web
does not limit communication to a certain territory. is is one aspect that dierentiates the web
from traditional mass media, where the scope of a medium is oen technically or logistically
limited to a certain territory (e.g., to the area where you can listen to a radio program or subscribe
to a newspaper). In this regard, the web is global. ere are some exceptions to this claim, but
in most countries, web content can be produced for any (foreign) audience and the audience
can access any (foreign) content. In other words, there are no technical barriers on the web
that would limit public discourses to national territories and publics. All (trans)transnational
communication ows are thus the result of decisions and actions of the actors communicating
online. is provides insight not only on how climate change is constructed as a public issue, but
also where boundaries are drawn in the collective imagination (Halvais, 2000).
However, lile is known about the transnationality of public discourses on the web—in particular
climate change. is thesis seeks to reduce this research decit by analyzing two mechanisms of
discourse transnationality: convergence and integration. Convergence means the harmonization
of public discourses on a certain issue in dierent countries over time. Complete convergence is
reached when the same issue is debated by dierent (national) publics simultaneously using the
same arguments (Eder & Kantner, 2000). is is the focus of the second study included in this thesis
(chapter 3). In “Overcoming language barriers: Assessing the potential of machine translation
and topic modeling for the comparative analysis of multilingual text corpora,” I compare how
actors from Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States discuss climate change on their
websites and assess whether the online discourses on climate change in these countries converge.
In the rst article (chapter 2), “Global climate change or national climate changes? An analysis of
the performance of online issue publics in integrating global issues,” the focus is on transnational
discourse integration. Integration means that foreign actors and their concerns are incorporated
in a discourse of a (national) public (Gerhards, 1993; Koopmans & Erbe, 2004). Traditional mass
media achieve this by giving foreign actors and their positions a platform in their coverage. e
same can be done by all actors when it comes to content on their websites; there, actors can
reference other actors, places, and issues. In addition, the web also provides the opportunity to
reference actors and their web content via hyperlinks. As hyperlinks directly aect the visibility
of content on the web (Park, 2003), this form of integration has a unique quality: it changes the
structure of the online public sphere (Koopmans & Zimmermann, 2010). In the rst article I
therefore examine both link types—hyperlinks and referential links—side by side. Based on these
links, I asses the degree and scope of transnational integration for climate change discourses on
the web in Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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e ndings of the two studies show that the public discourse on climate change is transnation-
alized to a considerable degree. First, the same topics dene the issue in the countries studied.
However, some of the topics are of dierent importance to the actors in these countries. In
the United States, the debate revolves largely around the question of whether climate change
exists, while in European countries the discussion of possible coping strategies is prevalent. e
discourses are therefore largely convergent in terms of the spectrum of what is discussed, but
not in terms of the importance that the individual topics have for the actors in the dierent
countries. Second, the discourses in the countries are shaped by both domestic and foreign actors.
In the European countries, transnational links are even more frequent than domestic links, which
indicates a high level of awareness for the transnational dimension of climate change. However,
the scope of transnationalization is restricted to countries of the Global North, with a clear bias
towards the United States. In the studied discourses of the Global North, the Global South is thus
a blind spot. Communication on the web therefore blurs some boundaries but at the same time
deepens others.
1.2 Role of online public discourse on climate change in the hy-
brid media system
e emergence of the web was a decisive moment in the evolution of the mediated public sphere as
it marked not only the transition from a nationally bounded media system but also the transition
from a linear and relatively exclusive to a multi-directional and inclusive regime of media discourse
production. What we know about the world today we do not necessarily know from the mass
media (cf. Luhmann, 1995). We might know it from Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia, Telegram, a
blog, a mailing list, or another online service. Alongside mass media, such online services have
become important venues of public communication. Governments, businesses, organizations,
groups, individuals, and even the mass media use them to put their messages forward to the
public. As a consequence, the mediated public sphere has become more diverse, more inclusive,
but also more complex and harder to understand for both citizens and researchers. Chadwick
(2013) refers to this decentralization process as a hybridization of the media system.
Although the mass media have lost their unique gatekeeper position in the hybrid media system,
their role in public discourse is still crucial: as aggregators of opinions and positions they oer
counter-publics a possible gateway into mainstream discourse. Counter-publics are groups of
actors who oppose the dominant public opinion and are therefore marginalized in mainstream
discourse (Fraser, 1990). For such groups, the web is an ideal space to discuss and determine their
position, dene their identity and shape their agenda. However, if they want to gain social and
political inuence, they must also succeed in communicating their messages to people outside their
community. is makes mass media coverage a valuable showcase to these groups. Despite this
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critical function of mass media for (partly anti-democratic) counter-public spheres, surprisingly
lile is known about the resonance of their online communication in legacy media.
is is all the more important as there are no borders for counter-publics on the web. ey can
organize themselves transnationally and thus benet from each other’s experience and resources
in their public communication at all political levels. In the case of climate change, this seems to
be particularly benecial for the skeptics in Europe. ey deny or talk down man-made climate
change and reject any measures to prevent it. In most European countries these positions make
them a counter-movement (Dunlap & McCright, 2015). e web, however, allows them to connect
with actors in the United States, where skeptics are well funded and part of the mainstream (Brulle,
2014; Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016). A transnational network thus benets the skeptics
in Europe in terms of professionally produced content (e.g., movies) and reputation. Whether
this helps them to get into the European mass media and thus into mainstream discourse is
examined in the third article included in this thesis (chapter 4). In ”How climate change skeptics
(try to) spread their ideas: Using computational methods to assess the resonance among skeptics’
and legacy media” we examine the discursive resonance of online climate change skepticism
in traditional media in Germany. Using dierent computational methods and qualitative case
studies, we study whether the transnational climate change skeptics’ counter-movement succeeds
in using online communication to trigger either continuous or selective resonance in German
mass media.
We found no evidence for continuous resonance. However, there were occasions of selective
resonance when climate change skeptics manage to exploit specic events to push their per-
spectives and positions onto the mass media’s agenda. Other than in the United States, German
skeptics have no allies among the conservative media. Although conservative media play down
climate change by giving less space to the issue in their reporting, they do not provide skeptics
with a platform in the mainstream discourse. e inuence of the skeptical counter-movement
on German mainstream discourse is therefore limited. Nevertheless, the transnational network
represents a valuable resource from which skeptical actors in all countries can benet when a
window of opportunity opens.
1.3 Methods to study transnational and multilingual public dis-
courses on the web
Despite the transnational reality of online public discourses and the growing importance of the
international level in many policy elds, political communication research still tends to focus
on the national level alone. is may be explained by the fact that most popular theories, like
the Habermasian notion of the public sphere (Habermas, 1962), are based on the premise of a
culturally homogeneous and politically sovereign nation state. Yet another factor is certainly that
studies involving several countries have long been dicult and expensive (Livingstone, 2003).
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is is especially true for studies that deal with communication in more than one language. Even
today, when communication researchers have many computational methods at their disposal,
most o-the-shelf tools are not suitable for multilingual analyses. However, the drastic increase
in computational capacity, the availability of training data, and improved access to soware have
the potential to change things for the beer.
Some eorts have been made in recent years to make topic models—an indispensable tool in the
toolbox of every computational communication researcher (Boumans & Trilling, 2016)—suitable
for the analysis of multilingual corpora (e.g., Lucas et al., 2015). With the second article of
my dissertation (chapter 3), I contribute to these eorts. In “Overcoming language barriers:
Assessing the potential of machine translation and topic modeling for the comparative analysis of
multilingual text corpora” I show how topic models can be combined with machine translation to
support comparative research across countries and languages. In the article, I assess the robustness
of dierent translation methods and test the integrability of the approach into a comparative
study design using a real world example: the analysis of transnational discourse convergence in
the case of climate change. e results show that the combination of machine translation and
topic models is a great option when it comes to the automated analysis of large multilingual
corpora. Regardless of whether full texts or only the vocabulary of a corpus is translated, the
approach produces reliable and robust results. Moreover, the analysis of transnational discourse
convergence (see above) has shown that machine translation and topic models can also be used
for comparative research.
is conclusion is supported by the third article included in this thesis (chapter 4). In this
article, we used machine translation and topic models to assess the thematic resonance among
climate change skeptics’ online communication and the reporting of German legacy media and
have thereby shown that the approach can easily be integrating into a more complex analysis
workow. Overall, these studies provide the proof of concept that tools for the analysis of
multilingual communication are available. So we should start using them to study communication
in transnational and multilingual seings more oen.
1.4 Limitations and future research
is dissertation sheds light on the geography of online public discourse on climate change,
determines its resonance in legacy media, and proposes a methodological approach for its analysis
across countries and languages. But it also has its blind spots and raises new questions. e rst
such question that must be highlighted is that of the motivation and communication strategy of
the actors. Since the analyses in the articles are primarily aimed at identifying (trans)national
communication paerns, lile can be said about what drives the actors to produce these paerns.
To gain a beer understanding of their reasoning, either the computation of inferential network
models (e.g., ERGMs) or a more qualitative approach is necessary. is could include a close
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linguistic analysis of the websites or interviews with the actors involved. Both approaches would
be helpful to improve our understanding of how public discourses work within the networked
public sphere.
e second question relates to the diusion of ideas on the web. e articles in this thesis are
based on the assumption that transnational communication networks foster the transnational
ow of knowledge, experiences, and ideas. e analysis of transnational discourse integration
even provides evidence for this (see chapter 2). As diusion is a process, however, it would
also be worth looking at transnational information ows over time and in more detail (e.g.,
individual arguments). is could provide valuable insights into the communication dynamics of
transnational counter-movements such as climate change skeptics.
inking beyond the web, it must be questioned how relevant the assumed linear ow of infor-
mation from the web into mass media and eventually into politics in today’s hybrid media system
still is. With their online communication, counter-movements may also succeed in geing their
ideas onto the public agenda and into politics without the support of mass media. To identify
the critical processes and mechanisms of the audience democracy (Kriesi, 2004) in the digital age,
more research on the mutual interaction of the various arenas is needed.
e nal question relates to the struggle for eective climate policies: Does a transnational
discourse actually help to meet the 2°C goal? As mentioned above, a transnationalization of the
discourse might be desirable from a theoretical point of view. In practice, however, transnational-
ization may rst and foremost benet climate change skeptics (as discussed in chapter 4). us,
we should not only continue our eorts to make skeptics’ practices transparent but also spend
more time thinking about how to handle the divergence of theoretical and political ideals. is
would advance both theoretical and empirical communication research.
7
Chapter 2
Global climate change or national
climate changes? An analysis of the
performance of online issue publics
in integrating global issues
Abstract: is paper analyzes how the complex global spatiality of climate change is integrated
into online national public discourses. Although the Web is an important venue for public
discourses, lile is known about its capability to integrate transnational issues. By looking at
two types of communicative links (hyperlinks and referential links), we assess the degree and
the scope of transnational integration for the four cases of Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. e ndings show that these national discourses are heavily
transnationalized. However, the scope of transnationalization is restricted to countries of the
Global North, with a clear focus on the United States. is leads to the conclusion that the Web’s
capability to integrate transnational issues is limited.
Note: is chapter is the accepted manuscript of an article published in Environmental Communi-
cation as Reber (2020), doi:10.1080/17524032.2020.1812685
Funding: e manuscript was created in the context of the Research Unit ”Political Communica-
tion in the Online World” (FOR 1381), Subproject 07, which is funded by the German Research
Foundation (DFG, project number 155794648). e subproject is also funded by the Swiss National
Science Foundation (SNSF, project number 100017E-154100).
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2.1 Introduction
Climate change is experienced and caused locally, but the climate system is global (IPCC, 2014).
is is why many of those most aected by the changing climate have contributed the least
to the greenhouse gases causing the problem (IPCC, 2014). Because of this complexity, climate
politics are local, national, regional, and global. In other words, political arenas on dierent levels
are closely intertwined in a multilevel system of climate governance (Di Gregorio et al., 2019;
Jänicke, 2017; Simonis, 2017). However, the national arena plays a particularly important role
in this system, as national governments are responsible for both negotiating and implementing
international treaties, such as the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). Since national governments
are legitimized by the citizens of their country (i.e., the national public), it is crucial that there
are national public discourses on climate change legislation, domestic greenhouse gas emissions,
and the local impacts of the changing climate. But it is just as crucial that there is a transnational
public discourse on international conferences and treaties, legislation in foreign countries, and the
eects of climate change in other parts of the world. Aer all, climate change is a global problem
that requires global awareness and a coordinated eort to solve it. From this point of view, a
public discourse in which both national and transnational facets of the issue are simultaneously
presented, linked and discussed—that is integrated—is not only desirable, but necessary.
But how well does this integration of both national and transnational aspects into the public
discourse on climate change work? Does the complexity of the issue translate into a public dis-
course that is national, global, or integrated? Looking at public discourses in legacy media, most
previous studies found what is best described as transnationalized national discourses, meaning
that public discourses are rst and foremost national because of national media systems but are
transnationalized through the frequent reporting about what is happening in other countries
and on the international level (Olausson, 2009; Schäfer, Post, Schwab, & Kleinen-von Königslöw,
2018; Wessler, Wozniak, Hofer, & Lück, 2016). It is no surprise that the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conferences are major catalysts for the transnation-
alization of national discourses (Eide & Kunelius, 2010). However, it is not only international
politics that trigger transnationalization but also exceptional events (e.g., storms, droughts, rallies,
elections) and prominent actors (e.g., politicians, celebrities) in other countries (Schäfer et al.,
2018).
is, however, does not necessarily hold true for the public discourse on the Web. Benne,
Lang, and Segerberg (2015) found highly fragmented national discourses when they analyzed the
online debate on climate change in Germany and the United Kingdom based on (trans)national
hyperlink networks. e authors found that national and transnational actors constitute separate
publics around the climate issue, each with a specic political arena in focus (i.e., a country or
a transnational body like the European Union). Because these issue publics are only weakly
connected, the domestic discourses remain mostly domestic.
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By increasing the ”spatial scope” (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004, p. 107) of the national discourses,
legacy media thus seem to integrate the complex spatiality of the climate change issue beer than
the seemingly borderless Web. In this study, we examine whether there is empirical evidence to
support this statement by analyzing and comparing the integrative performance of the national
discourses about climate change on the Web in Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the Unites Sates. To do so, we use the actor-centered issue mapping approach (Marres, 2015). is
approach allows us to determine both degree and scope of transnational integration of the issue
networks that represent these countries’ online public sphere devoted to climate change (Marres
& Rogers, 2005). Specically, we address two research questions:
• To what degree are the climate change issue networks in Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States transnationalized?
• What is the scope of transnationalization of these countries’ climate change issue networks?
Studying and comparing four cases allows us to identify both common and country-specic
paerns of transnationalization (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). In fact, such a comparative design
is the only way to study the geography of the public discourse on climate change beyond the
”bounded ’container[s]’ of the Westphalian nation state” (Volkmer, 2019, p. 251), without ignoring
them as the main political arenas in climate governance. As a result, this study contributes
to a beer understanding of the public discourse on climate change at both the national and
transnational level.
Moreover, our analysis is not only based on hyperlinks—the skeleton of issue networks—but also
considers referential links. Referential links are references to objects, persons, places, etc. made
in the text of a web page. Just like hyperlinks, they represent communicative ows and therefore
have a spatial dimension (Koopmans & Zimmermann, 2010). Although the analysis of referential
links is standard when studying the transnationality of discourses in legacy media, they are mostly
ignored in Web studies. Especially studies that use the issue mapping approach usually focus
on hyperlinks. However, it is unclear whether and how hyperlinks and referential links dier
when it comes to transnational communicative ows. We address this gap by examining both
types of links side by side. By doing so, we contribute to the extension of the empirical scope of
controversy analysis in online seings (cf. Marres, 2015).
2.2 eoretical Considerations
2.2.1 Issue Networks
e Web is an exceptional platform for public discourse, as there are no technical barriers that
would restrict public discourses to a certain space. With a simple website, everyone with internet
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access can get involved in any public discourse anywhere in the world at any time. is makes
the Web the cornerstone of the networked public sphere—a decentralized public sphere that is
facilitated by digital communication technologies (Benkler, 2006; Friedland & Rojas, 2006). It
builds on multi-directional communicative links among a potentially innite number of actors.
is notion ts the architecture of the Web perfectly, as the Web not only allows actors to easily
become their own publishers but also to connect with others via hyperlinks (Park, 2003).
Hyperlinks are the essential structural element of the Web. It directly depends on them, whether
webpages are visible to the audience (i.e., the users) or not (González-Bailón, 2009). is is either
because users move from one webpage to another via hyperlinks or because the algorithms of
search engines, such as Google (Brin & Page, 1998), deduce the importance of a webpage from the
hyperlinks it receives (Koopmans & Zimmermann, 2010). Search engines thereby take advantage
of the fact that actors with similar interests connect in issue networks (Marres & Rogers, 2005).
Issue networks are networks of public communication that form around a common and oen
contested topic (issue). e network consists of webpages and the hyperlinks connecting them.
However, issues do not exist a priori but are created through the dierent views expressed by
the actors in the network (Marres, 2006). e issue, therefore, constitutes the network, and the
network, conversely, constitutes the issue. Because issue networks are open to connection and
contestation among all interested actors (including citizens), the networks can be understood as
full-edged issue publics (Benne et al., 2015).
Issue networks are thus forums in which public discourses take place (e.g. on climate change).
Because they typically consist of actors from dierent elds (e.g., politics, civil society, science,
economy), they are not only a site of contention but also of public opinion formation (Marres,
2006). Because of their unrestricted accessibility, issue networks have the potential to serve as
a public source of knowledge and inspiration, as originator of public criticism and support for
political actions, as well as indicators of cultural and political change. ese processes are not
limited to the issue network. In the network public sphere, the views and opinions formed in
issue networks may spill over into mass media and politics and thus become eventually socially
and politically eective (Pfetsch, Adam, & Benne, 2013). In order to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of social and political developments, it is therefore essential to study the public
communication of issue networks.
2.2.2 Degree and Scope of Transnationality
Issue networks are not geography-free but tied to a political space. Otherwise, they could hardly
become politically ecient (Fraser, 2007). e spatiality of issue publics is created through the
association of its actors with a particular political space. Actors can communicate their scope—that
is their sphere of reference—via their website, for example by choosing a country-specic domain
ending (e.g., ”.us” or ”.de”). A national issue network therefore emerges when actors from the
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same country connect. By focusing on domestic aairs and actors, such networks produce an
issue that is primarily relevant to a national public. We can thus speak of a national issue public.
By integrating foreign actors (i.e., by linking to them), the network becomes transnationalized.
is extends the scope of the issue network, as it now also includes the views of foreign actors.
What is debated in the network thus becomes meaningful for a transnational public, which is
why we can speak of a transnational issue public in this case.
However, to what degree an issue public is transnationalized is relative. Based on the notion of
Deutsch (1953), the degree of transnationalization is typically dened as the ratio of communicative
interactions within a country to communicative interactions beyond the country (Gerhards &
Rössel, 1999; Koopmans & Erbe, 2004). When applied to issue networks, this means that the
degree of transnationalization is determined by the ratio of hyperlinks between actors with the
same scope (i.e., ”their” country) to hyperlinks between actors with dierent scopes.
Due to the important role of the national arena in climate politics (Simonis, 2017), it is reasonable
to proceed from national issue publics also when studying discourses on the technically boundless
Web (Cammaerts & Van Audenhove, 2005; Segerberg, 2012). e starting points in this study are
therefore national issue networks. In a rst step, the networks thus consist of domestic actors (i.e.,
actors from the same country), but are then ”open to connection and contestation” (Benne et al.,
2015, p. 112) among actors from every other political sphere. is allows us to check whether the
spatial reach and the boundaries of public communication correspond with national borders or
go beyond them (the degree of transnationalization). It also allows us to identify exactly which
other spheres are integrated into the national publics (the scope of transnationalization).
2.2.3 Communicative Links: Hyperlinks and Referential Links
Analyzing hyperlinks is a popular approach among scholars who are interested in the transnation-
ality of the Web. Many studies on international hyperlink networks (Barne, Chung, & Park, 2011;
Barne & Park, 2005; Halvais, 2000; Janc, 2015; Park, Barne, & Chung, 2011) and ”international
news ows” (Chang, Himelboim, & Dong, 2009; Himelboim, 2010; Segev, 2010; Segev & Hills,
2014) have measured cross-border communication based on hyperlinks. Studies with a more
specic focus on the transnationality of issue publics have likewise focused on hyperlinks in order
to measure the issue networks’ transnationality (Benne et al., 2015; Hepp et al., 2016; Koopmans
& Zimmermann, 2010; Rogers & Ben-David, 2008; Shumate & Dewi, 2008).
However, hyperlinks are only one specic form of communicative link. Another, much more
common form are links established through references in the text. at is by mentioning an
object, a person, or any other entity that could be named in the text of a webpage (i.e., without
seing a hyperlink). We call these in-text mentions referential links.
Although hyperlinks are the main structural element of the Web and the skeleton of issue
networks, referential links should not be ignored when analyzing public discourses online. Mainly
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because not all places and actors can be addressed via hyperlinks (e.g., countries, groups of
people), and hyperlinks are sometimes avoided (e.g., to avoid that a contradicting view becomes
visible). Although the analysis of referential links is not unusual in legacy media research (e.g.,
Adam, 2007; Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Schäfer et al., 2018; Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann,
Kleinen-von Königslöw, & Si, 2008b), it has rarely been used to analyze communication on
the Web. Exceptions are Koopmans and Zimmermann (2010), who manually coded statements
from actors (”claims”) on webpages and Segev (2010), as well as Segev and Hills (2014), who
automatically extracted country names from online news sites to measure transnationality in
public communication online.
Referential links and hyperlinks are thus two kinds of the same phenomenon: communicative
links. In order to obtain the full picture, both types should be analyzed simultaneously. is is
why we assess and compare degree and scope of transnationalization for both hyperlinks and
referential links.
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Case Selection
We concentrate on the national discourses in Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and
the United States (US). Although these are all Western democracies and signees of the UNFCCC
(1992), the situation for the domestic actors involved in climate politics are dierent. While
Germany, Switzerland and the UK are making some political eorts to meet the reduction targets
dened in the Paris Agreement, this is not the case for the US (Burck, Hagen, Marten, Höhne, &
Bals, 2019; Iacobuta, Dubash, Upadhyaya, Deribe, & Höhne, 2018). Climate change is an issue
that deeply divides the American society (Dunlap et al., 2016), but less so European societies
(McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pya, 2015). Moreover, the US is considerably larger than the
other three countries and therefore elds far more scientists, policy makers, and other actors
with an interest in climate change. Compared to the other countries, the US is also home to
more (hyper-partisan) online media and blogs that produce Web content for a domestic public
(He, Mayerhöer, Reinhardt, & Knüpfer, 2019). Consequently, the possibilities for political
inuence and alliances are dierent in the US and European countries. is is likely to aect
the communication behavior of the actors constituting the domestic issue networks (Häussler,
Adam, Schmid-Petri, & Reber, 2017). Apart from that, the UK1 and Germany are members of
the European Union, where climate change is a major policy eld (Jordan, van Asselt, Berkhout,
Huitema, & Rayner, 2012), while Switzerland and the US are not. British and German actors must
therefore take a additional political sphere into account, when they decide on their communication
strategy. However, the European sphere also oers them additional opportunities to publicly
promote their interests (Benne et al., 2015). Finally, the national languages dier: German is
1At the time of data collection.
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spoken in Germany and Switzerland (in some parts), English in the UK and US. Compared to
the ”English” Web, the ”German” Web is small, which means that the German-speaking actors
have few possibilities to link to actors of the same language. e following analysis aims to show
whether these contextual factors aect the linking behavior of the actors in the climate change
issue networks of these countries.
2.3.2 Generating Issue Networks
e four country-specic issue networks were gathered using a hyperlink-tracing procedure,
which consisted of four main steps (Adam, Häussler, Schmid-Petri, & Reber, 2016). First, we identi-
ed the most prominent actors in each country based on literature reviews, expert validation,2 and
country-specic Google searches.3 Prominent actors are known, credible and visible on the Web.
e Google searches were used to determine the visibility of the actors. e literature reviews
and the expert interviews then helped to determine whether an actor is known and credible.
We chose actors who scored well in all three criteria. In this step, the focus was exclusively on
national challenger actors. Following Kriesi (2004, p. 189), we understood challengers to be those
actors with a (political) goal but no institutionalized access to formal political institutions or the
media (e.g., non-governmental organizations, bloggers, universities, think tanks). ey are the
”champions of online climate communication” (Schäfer, 2012, p. 530), as they make extensive
use of the Web to address the public (or parts of the public). However, their motivations and
interests in public communication can dier greatly (cf. Stein, 2009). erefore, also their national
respectively transnational orientation potentially diers. In order to capture the whole spectrum
of the debate, the four most prominent climate advocates, as well as the four most prominent
climate skeptics, were chosen as starting points for the snowball sampling procedure (see list of
actors in the Appendix, chapter 2.6).
is second step was done with the help of the crawler soware Issue Crawler (Rogers, 2013).
We set the crawler to start from the main page dealing with climate change on the seed actors’
websites (the URLs are also listed in the Appendix, chapter 2.6), following all internal hyperlinks
two levels deep into the respective website, and then collected all outgoing hyperlinks from these
pages that were directed to external webpages, no maer whether they were challenger actors or
not. e obtained issue networks are therefore not just challenger networks. In a nal iteration,
the crawler checked for hyperlinks running between the already indexed pages. Pretests have
shown that more iterations primarily lead to the inclusion of US actors. e national networks
of the European countries thus become quasi US networks. Moreover, an additional iteration
produced a large number of webpages unrelated to climate change. Due to capacity constraints, it
2We asked researchers investigating climate change discourse and policy in the four countries to validate and, if
necessary, modify the lists of actors obtained by literature reviews and Google searches.
3e English terms ”climate change” and ”global warming” as well as the corresponding German terms ”Klimawan-
del” and ”Globale Erwärmung” were used as search terms. ese are oen used and identied as appropriate search
terms to capture the issue of climate change (Painter & Gavin, 2016; Shapiro & Park, 2015).
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was not possible to identify, download and check all these webpages on a monthly basis. erefore,
no further crawling iterations were made.
In the third step, we downloaded all crawled webpages and then automatically indexed them
according to our search terms in order to ensure that the climate change issue was actually
addressed on these webpages. is is the crucial step in generating issue networks on the basis
of hyperlink networks, as it removes a substantial amount of noise (Waldherr, Maier, Miltner, &
Günther, 2017).
Finally, we aggregated the crawled webpages and manually coded them. e aggregation was
done at the actor level. is means that webpages were not only aggregated on the basis of their
domain but that domains of the same actors were also grouped together. Actors could be both
individuals (e.g., bloggers) and organizations (e.g., NGOs, companies, governmental bodies). en,
the scope of all actors was manually coded using the information usually found on the ”About us”
page or a similar section of their website(s). e guiding principle was to take the perspectives of
the actors and to determine whether they have a national focus (e.g., Switzerland, Germany) or a
transnational one (e.g., EU, United Nations).4 We have taken into account whether an actor is the
national branch of a transnational organization. For example, we coded the national scope for
Greenpeace Germany and the transnational scope for Greenpeace international.
Hyperlinks originating from foreign actors were eventually removed from the networks, as
the focus of the study is on national issue publics. is is the strictest and most conservative
denition of national issue publics, as only the linking behavior of the domestic actors is taken
into account. is ensures that the country-specic degree and scope of transnationalization
is captured, without any bias caused by the linking of foreign actors who are only indirectly
involved (i.e., by being linked into the network) in the national climate change discourse.
Instead of using only one issue network per country, we used 12 (or 11)5 and reported mean
values for all measures. For each country, one issue network was generated at the beginning of
each month between June 2012 and May 2013. is was done because issue networks typically
have a relatively stable core, but always show a certain uctuation at the margins. A comparison
of snapshots taken at only one point in time can therefore lead to biased ndings. To obtain more
reliable measurements, we decided to smoothen the networks over a 12-month period. Table 2.1
shows the average number of actors, hyperlinks, and referential links of the issue networks. It
also illustrates the variance at the fringes of the networks by reporting the standard deviations.
4e coding was done by two trained student assistants. e training process consisted of several rounds of coding
an identical set of actors, followed by a comparison with the master coding and a discussion of the results. e intercoder
reliability was assessed by comparing the coders’ classication with the master coding. We used Krippendor’s alpha
to measure the agreement between the coders’ classication and the master coding as the coecient is comparable
across any number of coders, values, metrics, and sample sizes. For the scope variable (distinguishing 199 categories),
Krippendor’s alpha was 0.93 and therefore satisfactory (1 means complete agreement). roughout data collection,
critical cases were discussed and coded in coders’ meetings.
5A total of 12 for Switzerland and the UK and, due to technical issues in the network gathering process, 11 for
Germany and the US.
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Germany Switzerland United Kingdom United States
Actors
Domestic 88 (10) 24 (3) 127 (7) 441 (71)
Foreign 190 (23) 120 (8) 218 (16) 341 (62)
Unknown 5 (1) 4 (1) 14 (2) 47 (8)
Hyperlinks
Domestic 2,808 (668) 180 (94) 1,071 (157) 20,511 (3,348)
Transnational 5,800 (747) 387 (279) 2,518 (532) 14,234 (2,042)
Unknown 6 (3) 4 (4) 156 (9) 1,121 (370)
Referential links
Domestic 5,830 (464) 127 (30) 11,785 (1,424) 48,277 (6,509)
Transnational 5,342 (375) 472 (198) 16,308 (2,679) 35,932 (4,676)
Unknown 2,762 (286) 206 (94) 13,810 (1,289) 28,923 (4,024)
Table 2.1: Key gures of issue networks.
Reported are the number of actors, the number of hyperlinks, and the number of referential links
(rounded means, standard deviations in parentheses).
2.3.3 Extracting Referential Links
To identify the referential links in the text of the webpages, automated and manual content
analysis methods were used. First, 10,095 actors were identied as important for the climate
change discourses in Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. is was done by the manual
content analysis of 1,680 webpages, 1,545 newspaper articles, and 774 political documents dealing
with climate change. e news articles and political documents were published by newspapers
and political institutions located in the four countries and obtained through media database
searches and web scraping governmental websites (cf. Häussler, Schmid-Petri, Adam, Reber, &
Arlt, 2016).6 ey were collected at the same time as the issue networks, and the manual coded
webpages were directly sampled from the issue networks’ corpus. Trained coders identied the
most important actors in every document and coded their scope if it was indicated in the text.7
e manual coded list of climate actors was merged with a generic list of around 1.3 million
names of people and organizations (e.g., ”Angela Merkel”) as well as multiword units (e.g., ”market
economy”). We then used this extensive list as a dictionary to search for named entities in the text
of the webpages. In addition, we trained two probabilistic sequence classiers—one for German-
and one for English-language documents—and used them for the identication of additional,
previously unknown named entities. Conditional random eld models (CRF) from the Stanford
CoreNLP package (Finkel, Grenage, & Manning, 2005) were used as classier algorithms. Of the
additionally identied named entities, the 500 most frequent were then coded by a trained coder.
Whether the reference to a named entity counted as a national, transnational, or unknown
referential link was inferred from both the scope of the webpage and the scope of the named
entity (e.g. the mention of Angela Merkel on a webpage of Greenpeace Germany would thus count
as a domestic referential link, the mention of Barack Obama on the same webpage would count as
transnational link). As for the hyperlinks, only referential links from domestic actors’ webpages
were collected. e obtained numbers are summarized in Table 2.1. What is obvious, compared to
6e same search terms as for the webpages were used to index the newspaper articles and political documents.
7e coding was done by seven trained coders. As for the networks, the intercoder reliability was assessed by
comparing the coders’ classication with a master coding. For the scope variable (distinguishing 199 categories),
Krippendor’s alpha was 0.82 and thus acceptable.
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hyperlinks, is the higher number of unknown referential links. is is due to the oen unspecic
references. For example, actors oen referred to ”scientists” or ”science” in general rather than a
person or an institution specically. In such cases, the scope of the named entity was labelled as
unknown.
2.3.4 Measures
To measure the degree of transnationalization, we used the E-I index (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988).
e index is a metric for what Koopmans and Erbe (2004) called ”the relative density of public
communication within and between political spaces” (p. 102). For the case of the national issue




where di denotes the number of domestic links and ti the number of transnational links in
the national issue network i. An E-I score of 1 would, therefore, indicate that every link is
transnational. A score of −1 would indicate the opposite, that every link is domestic. An E-I score
of 0 means that there are the same number of domestic and transnational links in the network.
For the degrees reported in the following section, we rst calculated the E-I ratios for all the issue
networks gathered and then computed the mean ratio per country on this basis.
To measure the scope of transnationalization, we dierentiated between horizontal and verti-
cal transnational links (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004). Horizontal-transnational links connect ac-
tors/entities from dierent countries. is means that the primary scope of both source and target
is national (but dierent). is is the case when a German think tank (e.g., Heinrich Boell Stiung)
links to a British NGO (e.g., Oxfam UK). A vertical-transnational link connects an actor with a
primarily national scope with an actor/entity with a scope that is transnational. is could be, for
example, the European Commission, representatives of the UN, or a globally active NGO (e.g.,
Greenpeace). e distinction between horizontal and vertical links is useful because it provides
us with an indication of the importance of international/supranational institutions in climate
politics relative to national ones. e scope of transnationalization of the issue networks was thus
determined by the relative frequency of (1) domestic, (2) horizontal-transnational (dierentiating
between countries), (3) vertical-transnational, and (4) unknown links. e values presented in the
following section are based on the mean number of links over all the issue networks per country.
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2.4 Findings
2.4.1 Degree of Transnationalization
e dierent degrees of transnationalization are shown in Figure 2.1. Looking at the hyperlinks
rst, Figure 2.1 shows that there is a positive degree in all countries except the US. is means
that the relative density of transnational hyperlinks in Germany (EIH,DE = 0.355), Switzerland
(EIH,CH = 0.272), and the UK (EIH,UK = 0.399) is higher than that of domestic links. In the
US, however, the domestic hyperlinks are denser than the transnational ones (EIH,US = −0.179).
Figure 2.1: Degrees of transnationalization (E-I index) across countries and link type.
e picture is slightly dierent for referential links. In particular, German domestic actors have a
faint preference to link domestically when they use referential links (EIR,DE = −0.043). is is
in contrast to hyperlinks, where the German actors have a clear transnational orientation. In the
other countries, the E-I index for referential links goes in the same direction as for hyperlinks.
In Switzerland, there is an even clearer external orientation (EIR,CH = 0.552), whereas the UK
(EIR,UK = 0.157) and the US (EIR,US = −0.146) are a lile closer to the center in this case.
Overall, these results show that there is a pronounced, if varied, external orientation in all the
European countries, with Switzerland being the most externally oriented. e US, on the other
hand, shows a slight domestic, or internal, orientation.
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2.4.2 Scope of Transnationalization
Figure 2.2 summarizes where the communicative links of the actors in the issue networks go.
Looking at the transnational hyperlinks rst, the gure shows that German actors link mainly to
actors in the US (36.7%). A smaller fraction of the hyperlinks lead to actors from the UK (13%) and
actors with a genuine transnational scope (12.7%). Only 2.9% of the hyperlinks in the German
issue network point to Swiss actors, and even less (2.1%) to actors from other countries (i.e.,
Canada 0.5%, Ireland 0.5%, Liechtenstein 0.5%).
e Swiss actors, in turn, link preferably to Germany (26.1%). Less frequently, the hyperlinks of
Swiss actors lead to websites from transnational actors (23.7%) and American webpages (16.5%).
Only on very rare occasions (2.1%) does a link from a Swiss actor lead to another country (Denmark
0.2%, Austria 0.2%, Russia 0.2%).
British actors most frequently link horizontally to American actors (29.4%) and less oen verti-
cally to transnational actors (15.4%). e other transnational hyperlinks lead to actors from the
Commonwealth (Canada 10.6%, Australia 5.1%, New Zealand 2.6%, India 0.2%), as well as Norway
(3.1%). Other countries include France (0.5%) and Germany (0.1%).
Actors from the US link to British actors most frequently (14.6%) and less oen to actors at the
transnational level (7.9%), from Australia (6.7%), or Canada (6.4%). Hyperlinks to other countries
(Germany 1.4%, New Zealand 1.2%, Czech Republic 0.9%, Denmark 0.2%, Sweden 0.2%) account
for only 4.1% of the hyperlinks in the American issue networks.
e picture is only slightly dierent for referential links. First, there are more links to the transna-
tional level (vertical transnationalization). Second, the scope for horizontal transnationalization is
a lile wider with referential links than with hyperlinks. German actors link to the transnational
level the most (15.6%). Horizontally, they mainly link to actors from the US (8.8%), the UK (3.8%),
and Switzerland (2%), followed by Brazil (1.5%), France (1.1%), China (0.6%), and Russia (0.5%).
e horizon of Swiss actors mainly encompass the transnational level (19.3%). Horizontally, Swiss
actors most oen link to the US (12.3%), Germany (10.3%), and the UK (6.7%). Other countries
include China (1.4%), Pakistan (1.1%), and Afghanistan (0.8%). On British webpages, users most
likely nd references to the transnational level (15.6%) or to actors from the US (12.4%). Less fre-
quently, they nd references to named entities based in Australia (2.2%), Canada (1.2%), Germany
(0.9%), China (0.7%), Denmark (0.5%), France (0.5%), India (0.4%), Russia (0.4%), and Switzerland
(0.4%). Finally, American actors refer most frequently to actors with a transnational scope (14%).
Horizontally, they frequently refer to actors from the UK (6.1%). Other countries include Australia






























































































In this study, we evaluated the degree and the scope of transnationalization in the online discussion
of climate change in four countries. e goal was to determine whether the discourse is nationally
fragmented or transnationally integrated. Based on the ndings reported in the previous section,
we can say that the online discourses on climate change in Germany, Switzerland, the UK are
transnationally integrated. In the US, the picture diers: despite a notable degree of transnation-
alization, there is a clear internal orientation in the US discourse. As in legacy media (Schäfer et
al., 2018), horizontal transnationalization is more pronounced than vertical transnationalization
in all countries. us, not only are supranational institutions and transnational civil society
actors integrated into the national issue publics but also foreign national actors. is shows that
even actors whose primary focus is on the domestic national sphere consider climate change a
transnational issue. Consequently, transnational links appear to be a central tool in their online
communication toolbox. ey can be used to support foreign allies, to legitimize the own position,
to educate the audience, or to mobilize the public (cf. Schäfer, 2012). Horizontal links allow the
actors to refer to peers and political institutions on the national level, while vertical links highlight
the specialized civil society actors and institutions at the international and supranational level
(Benne et al., 2015). However, the high number of horizontal links can be indicative that, despite
the prominent international and supranational institutions dealing with climate change (e.g.,
EU, UN, IPCC), the national level is still the most important in climate politics. Whether this is
actually the case, a more in-depth analysis of the strategies and motivations of the actors in the
issue networks has to show.
Despite the relatively high degrees, the scope of transnationalization is limited to countries and
actors of the Global North. is suggests that the focus of the public debate within the studied
countries is primarily on those causing the problem, rather than on those aected by it. is is
true for both hyperlinks and referential links and is highly problematic, as it prevents the actors
of the Global South from speaking for themselves in the national discourses of the Global North.
As with other issues and media (Rogers & Ben-David, 2008; Shumate & Dewi, 2008; Yang, 2012),
the Web seems not to eliminate the north-south divide but to deepen it.
Furthermore, as the results have shown, language regions limit the scope of transnational commu-
nicative links. Links from non-English-speaking countries to English-speaking ones—especially
the US—occur more oen than vice versa. However, this paern is not climate change-specic and
has been documented by other studies looking at hyperlink networks (Barne, Chon, & Rosen,
2001; Barne et al., 2011; Halvais, 2000; Takhteyev, Gruzd, & Wellman, 2012). e same is true
for the fact that actors from smaller countries link to actors from bigger countries more oen
than the other way round (e.g., Switzerland to Germany or the UK to the US). e issue networks
analyzed here also reect a paern known from legacy media, where the US typically receives the
most aention of any other country in other nations’ media (Chang et al., 2009; Himelboim, 2010;
Segev, 2010; Segev & Hills, 2014). In return, the degree of transnationalization in the discourse on
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climate change in American mass media has been identied as comparatively low (Broadbent
et al., 2016; Schäfer et al., 2018). is matches our results, according to which the US is the only
country with a negative E-I ratio, indicating a stronger internal than external orientation of the
actors in the issue network.
Overall, the Web’s capability to integrate the complex spatiality of climate change into national
discourses has proven to be limited. Regarding an inclusive and ambitious global climate policy
that aims to meet the targets of the UNFCCC, not only the absence of actors from the global South
seems problematic, but also the high visibility of US actors in the European discourses. In the US,
climate change is a highly controversial issue (Dunlap et al., 2016), which is reected in a strong
online presence of domestic climate skeptics (Elgin, 2015; Schmid-Petri, 2017). In this polarized
context, both skeptics and advocates nd political allies. Transnational links are therefore less
important for US actors (Häussler et al., 2017). e situation is dierent in Europe, where climate
change skeptics constitute a counter-movement in most countries. As politically isolated actors,
they use the Web to form transnational advocacy networks with like-minded actors from other
countries. Recent research has shown that skeptics from Germany and the UK link to US skeptics
for this purpose (Adam, Häussler, Schmid-Petri, & Reber, 2019). Such an integration of skeptical
actors into the national discourses of European countries may have a negative impact on the
public support of constructive policies in these countries. In order to investigate this hypothesis,
future research should not only unravel the linking behavior of the dierent camps (i.e., skeptics
and advocates), but also show how they inuence others—like citizens or the mass media—with
their online communication behavior.
Moreover, future work should seek explanations for the reported paerns of national (non-
)transnationalization. Besides country-specic factors, such as language and size, future studies
should also take actor-specic factors, such as their position regarding climate change, into
account. Such analyses would not only allow for a statement about which actors transnationalize
the national discourses but also provide information about their possible intentions. Further
studies may also conduct a combined analysis of network and content data (as in Schmid-Petri et
al., 2018), as content provides context information for an accurate interpretation of communicative
links (cf. De Maeyer, 2012). Missing context is a major limitation of the approach adopted here.
In particular, it is not clear for referential links whether the actors are mentioned as speakers
or addressees (cf. Koopmans & Erbe, 2004), nor whether the links are meant to be critical or
supportive. Another limitation of this study relates to the number of languages considered.
Although German and English are the languages spoken in the studied countries, national issue
networks do not have to be monolingual. is holds true for multilingual Switzerland but also for
many other countries. Future studies should, therefore, consider more languages, both for the
selection of countries and for the indexing of webpages. In addition, more national discourses
on climate change should be examined. It would be particularly desirable that the integrative
performance of issue networks in the Global South is examined.
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Finally, the ndings have shown that although hyperlinks and referential links are both com-
municative links, their use paerns dier. e horizon is wider with referential links, yet at
the same time, they are used for more vertical-transnational references, as well as non-specic
references, than hyperlinks. Moreover, referential links are much more common than hyperlinks.
is suggests that hyperlinks are used more selectively. ey are a communicative tool that allows
actors to make the Web content of others directly accessible to their readers (Park, 2003). is is
neither always possible nor desired. For example, skeptics and advocates avoid linking to each
other (Schmid-Petri et al., 2018). Referential links are less problematic in this respect: they do
not make the content of the addressee directly accessible. ey are also less language-sensitive
and allow general references (e.g., to ”the people”), as our results have shown. e analysis of
hyperlinks therefore reveals not the complete picture. is should be taken into account when
communicative links are used to study social and political processes.
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2.6 Appendix
Starting points for the snowball-sampling of websites in Germany, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Germany
Advocates
Heinrich Boell Stiung hp://klima-der-gerechtigkeit.boellblog.org
Greenpeace Germany hp://www.greenpeace.de/themen/klima/nachrichten


























Friends of the Earth UK hp://www.foe.org/projects/climate-and-energy
WWF UK hp://www.wwf.org.uk/what we do/
tackling climate change
Skeptics
e Global Warming Policy Foundation hp://thegwpf.org











e Heartland Institute hp://heartland.org/issues/environment
Climate Depot hp://www.climatedepot.com
C3 Headlines hp://www.c3headlines.com
Was Up With at? hp://wasupwiththat.com




Assessing the potential of machine
translation and topic modeling for
the comparative analysis of
multilingual text corpora
Abstract: is study assesses the potential of topic models coupled with machine translation
for comparative communication research across language barriers. From a methodological point
of view, the robustness of a combined approach is examined. For this purpose the results of
dierent machine translation services (Google Translate vs. DeepL) as well as methods (full-text vs.
term-by-term) are compared. From a substantive point of view, the integrability of the approach
into comparative study designs is tested. For this, the online discourses about climate change in
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are compared. First, the results show that
the approach is relatively robust and second, that integration in comparative study designs is not
a problem. It is concluded that this as well as the relatively moderate costs in terms of time and
money makes the strategy to couple topic models with machine translation a valuable addition to
the toolbox of comparative communication researchers.
Note: is chapter is the accepted manuscript of an article published in Communication Methods
and Measures as Reber (2019), doi:10.1080/19312458.2018.1555798
Funding: e manuscript was created in the context of the Research Unit ”Political Communica-
tion in the Online World” (FOR 1381), Subproject 07, which is funded by the German Research
Foundation (DFG, project number 155794648). e subproject is also funded by the Swiss National
Science Foundation (SNSF, project number 100017E-154100).
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3.1 Introduction
In communication research, comparing instances of public communication has become a popular
approach to gain a beer understanding of publics and discourses. is is because the compar-
ative perspective allows us to draw conclusions beyond the individual case, either by testing
theories in diverse seings or by evaluating the scope and signicance of certain phenomena in
dierent contexts (Esser & Hanitzsch, 2012). Even more so in times of digitalization, in which
national borders are becoming increasingly permeable for communication ows, the comparative
perspective is important to answer the question whether a phenomenon is common across the
globe or distinctive to a certain country (Esser, 2013; Livingstone, 2012).
However, comparing instances of public communication is theoretically as well as methodologi-
cally challenging (cf. Livingstone, 2003). is is especially true if the compared cases happen to
be in dierent languages. For such comparisons, not only must instruments be developed that
work for all studied cases, but also must there be people with the right language skills to collect
and analyse the data. is makes analyses of multilingual text corpora particularly complex,
labor-intensive, and costly. It is therefore of great interest that now well-established automated
content analysis methods can also be used for comparisons of public communication across
multiple languages.
One such method, which is now a standard tool in communication research (Boumans & Trilling,
2016; Grimmer & Stewart, 2013), are so-called bag-of-words topic models. ese are generative
models which allow the identication of underlying thematic structures (i.e., topics) even in
large amounts of text (Jacobi, van Aeveldt, & Welbers, 2016). ey are called bag-of-words
models because the order of the words in a document (i.e., its syntactic structure) is ignored in the
modeling process. However, they are not designed for the analysis of multilingual corpora as the
resulting topics directly depend on the vocabulary used in the documents (cf. Blei, Ng, & Jordan,
2003). Since languages have dierent vocabularies, topic models separate topics by language.
Standard topic models are thus blind for thematic structures which cross language boundaries.
To solve this “confusion of tongues,” there are two possible ways: either compute a topic model
on the multilingual corpus and match the topics aer or translate the corpus into a common
language rst and then compute the model. e rst approach is challenging because additional
internal or external information is needed to bring the topics together (e.g., Wikipedia entries on
the same topic in dierent languages, as used in the Polylingual Topic Model by Mimno, Wallach,
Naradowsky, Smith, and McCallum 2009). e second approach is easier, given that a low-cost
and reliable translation of the corpus is possible. anks to improvements in cheap machine-
translation services such as Google Translate (Lotz & van Rensburg, 2014), this seems to be a
feasible option. In fact, it has recently been shown that machine translation and topic modeling
can be combined to study public communication (De Vries, Schoonevelde, & Schumacher, 2018;
Lucas et al., 2015).
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is article continues along this path by assessing the potential of such a combined approach for
comparative communication research. From a methodological point of view, the robustness of
the approach is examined by determining whether the choice of translation service and method
maers when it is used for analytical purposes. From a substantive point of view, it is examined
whether topic modeling coupled with machine translation can be linked to existing theories and
work from the eld of comparative communication research in such a way that it is a valuable add-
on to the toolbox. For both, the online discourses about climate change in Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America are used as test cases. As a global phenomenon, climate
change is a widely studied topic in the eld of comparative communication research. However,
the focus has been on oine media so far. A multilingual comparison of online discourses is
uncharted territory and thus an ideal research subject to assess the potential of topic modeling in
combination with machine translation for comparative analyses.
3.1.1 Study 1: Robustness
De Vries et al. (2018) have shown that the translations of professional human translators (“gold
standard”) and Google Translate are quite similar when documents are considered a “bag of words”
(i.e., ignoring the syntactic structure) and thus concluded that machine translation services are
indeed useful tools when it comes to the analysis of multilingual text corpora with topic models.
But how much do translation results of dierent machine translation providers dier? Or to
put it another way: Does it maer which translation provider is used for the translation of a
multilingual text corpus when topic models are used for its analysis? To answer this question, this
study compares two full-text translations of the same corpus—one by Google Translate and one by
DeepL. is is the current top dog (Google Translate) compared to the rising star (DeepL) in the
eld of online machine translation providers. According to their own surveys, DeepL currently
provides the best translations of all online translation services available (DeepL, 2017). However,
it remains to be seen whether the beer results of DeepL—in terms of readability—are also of
importance in bag-of-word analyses or if Google Translate does the job equally well.
In their assessment, De Vries et al. (2018) focused on translations of whole documents. However,
since most machine-translation services charge fees based on the number of translated characters,
it would be signicantly more cost-eective (as well as time-saving) if every word in a corpus has
to be translated only once. e good thing about topic models is that they perceive documents
just as vectors containing the count of each word within the document, ignoring the order in
which they appear (i.e., bag of words). For the modeling process, all documents of a corpus are
bound together in a so-called document-term matrix (DTM), containing the frequency of each
word (term) in each document. e translation of the unique terms of a DTM (i.e., its vocabulary)
would thus be an extremely ecient way to obtain a monolingual corpus, as every word must be
translated only once instead of multiple times for every document. One potential problem with
such a term-by-term translation, however, is that the absence of the syntactic structure may aect
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the outcome of the translation. e question thus is whether this shortcut is a valid alternative
to the more expensive full-text translation. Or more precisely: Does it maer which translation
method is used for topic model analyses?
us far, only Lucas et al. (2015) compared a DTM translation to a full-text translation of the same
corpus in combination with topic modeling. Aer translating Chinese and Arabic tweets into
English, they computed topic models on both corpora and assessed their similarity by comparing
the content of the topics (i.e., their word probabilities). ey concluded that “two investigators
using dierent translation methods might have reached similar substantive conclusions” (Lucas
et al., 2015, p. 274). is result is checked here by systematically comparing the term-by-term
translation of a corpus (DTM translation) to the full-text translations of the same corpus mentioned
above. Google Translate was chosen for the DTM translation. ere are two reasons for this
choice: First, Google Translate was also the choice of Lucas et al. (2015) for their DTM translation.
is allows the translation service to be kept constant. Second, DeepL restricts the use of their
API in a way that a DTM translation does not save time (and money) compared to a full-text
translation.1
3.1.2 Study 2: Integrability
e number of socioscientic studies that have explicitly used machine translation is still limited.
us far, most studies have had a methodological focus, as they either proposed and evaluated
concrete analytical procedures that build on machine-translated texts (Agarwal, Xie, Vovsha,
Rambow, & Passonneau, 2011; Balahur & Turchi, 2014; Pennings, 2011), evaluated the quality of
machine-translation services (e.g., Hampshire & Porta Salvia, 2010; Lotz & van Rensburg, 2014),
or assessed their usefulness for analyses with text models (De Vries et al., 2018; Lucas et al., 2015).
Studies that have used machine translation to examine substantive questions are especially rare.
Benoit, Schwarz, and Traber (2012) translated parts of their corpus of parliamentary speeches for
an analysis of legislators’ policy preferences and Zhou, Cristea, and Roberts (2015) used Google
Translate for a sentiment analysis of war-related Wikipedia articles. In any case, the possible
value of machine translation and topic modeling for comparative communication research has
hardly been shown (the study by Lucas et al., 2015 is the notable exception). For this reason, a
substantive question is examineded here. Specically, it is examined whether actors in Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States debate the same aspects of climate change on their
websites and whether they accord them similar relevance.
Since climate change is a global problem that might only be solved globally, it is important to
know whether the public discourse about it is rather national or transnational in nature. To assess
that, issue networks are studied here. at are networks of public communication, consisting
1is changed with the introduction of the DeepL Pro plan. For this study, however, an earlier and more restricted
version of the API was used. Due to the restrictions (i.e., limited number of translation requests per time), the translation
of the DTM would have taken considerably longer than the full-text translation.
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of the websites as well as the hyperlinks connecting the contents of these websites (Marres &
Rogers, 2005). Benne et al. (2015) argue that such issue networks are full-edged issue publics,
as they are open to connection and contestation among all kinds of actors. One way to measure
the transnationality of such issue networks is through the analysis of hyperlink connections
(e.g., Benne et al., 2015). Another way is to analyze the contents of the websites. e second
approach was chosen here, as discourse convergence has been identied as one of the main
indicators for the transnationality of public discourses (Eder, 2000; Eder & Kantner, 2000; Kantner,
2004). At the core stands the question of “whether speakers in dierent national public spheres
identify the same issue as important, accord them similar relevance, and employ similar problem
denitions” (Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann, Kleinen-von Königslöw, & Si, 2008a, p. 11). From
that point of view, a public discourse is transnational “if within an anonymous mass public the
same issues are discussed at the same time under similar criteria of relevance” (Eder & Kantner,
2000, p. 315, translation by the author). For the this study, it means that actors in Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States have to discuss the same aspects of climate change on
their websites and accord them similar relevance for it to be a transnationalized debate.
Although there is a rich and growing body of literature regarding online climate change com-
munication (for an overview, see Schäfer 2012), comparative studies are still the exception (e.g.,
Häussler et al., 2017; Jang & Hart, 2015). e content of the public debate about climate change
has thus far only been compared in regard to Twier (Kirilenko & Stepchenkova, 2014) and the
mass media (e.g., Grundmann & Sco, 2014; Ivanova, 2017; Ivanova, Schmidt, & Schäfer, 2014;
Schmidt, Ivanova, & Schäfer, 2013) across countries and languages.
is study therefore addresses three questions: First, how much do translation results of dierent
machine translation providers dier? Second, is the translation of a DTM a valid alternative
to the full-text translation of a corpus? ird, is the online climate change discourse the same
in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States? All three questions aim to clarify
whether the combination of machine translation and topic modeling are a valuable addition to
the methodical toolbox of comparative communication researchers. In the following section, the
data-collection procedure as well as the steps taken for the preprocessing and translation of the
corpus is described. en, the comparison of the translation providers as well as the translation
methods is explained (study 1), and the procedure for the cross-country analysis of the climate
change discourse is laid out (study 2). e results of both studies are then presented. e paper
concludes with a discussion of the results as well as the promises and limitations of the applied
approach for comparative communication research.
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3.2 Data and Method
3.2.1 Web Scraping and Building of the Corpus
e corpus for both studies—the comparisons of translation providers/methods and the comparison
of the climate change discourse in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—was
collected in June 2014 in the course of a larger project conducted with collaborative partners
(Adam et al., 2016). at project proceeded in four steps to gather all sorts of websites with an
interest in climate change, which includes, but is not limited to, websites of civil society actors
(such as NGOs, Blogs, universities, churches), the media, and governmental bodies.
A snowball-sampling strategy was used to harvest hyperlink-networks originating from carefully
selected starting points in four countries (four climate advocates and four climate skeptics in
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States; see the list in Appendix A, chapter 3.5.1).
is was done with the help of the crawler soware Issue Crawler (Rogers, 2013). e starting
points were chosen based on literature reviews, expert interviews, and country-specic Google
searches.
e crawled websites were then indexed according to keywords to ensure that they related to
climate change, and they were downloaded if at least one keyword was mentioned once.2
To obtain additional information about the actors included in this sample, the country of activity
(national, transnational) as well as the name of the actor was coded manually by two coders using
information found on the “about us” or a similar page.3
e nal step was the extraction of plain text from the archived HTML documents. To do this, all
HTML markups were deleted using the Java-based content extraction library Apache Tika. en,
meaningless terms used on most web pages (e.g., navigation elements, copyright information) were
ltered out by deleting all sentences containing “regular expressions” (i.e., character sequences
dening search paerns) from a blacklist. e remaining documents were then categorized
according to their language (German or English) by a language-detection algorithm and marked
as duplicates if their similarity, dened by the Jaccard index on their word set, was above a
threshold of 0.95.
For the analyses conducted in this study, the corpus was reduced by removing all duplicates,
all websites from non-German, non-British, and non-U.S. American actors, and all websites not
wrien in German or English. For June 2014, this resulted in a total of 875 unique web pages
published by 95 German actors, 2,172 web pages published by 181 British actors, and 3,896 web
pages published by 539 U.S. American actors. From the total of 6,843 web pages, 633 were wrien
2Keywords: climate change, global warming, Klimawandel*, globale* Erwärmung
3e intercoder reliability was measured by comparing the coders’ classication with a master coding. Krippen-
dor’s alpha was .93 for the country of activity (distinguishing 199 categories). e intercoder reliability was thus
satisfactory.
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in German and 6,310 in English because some German actors also publish in English. For the
assessment of the translation providers/methods, only the 633 web pages wrien in German were
considered.
3.2.2 Translation and Preprocessing
e translations process of the 633 German full-texts was straightforward: e documents were
translated via Google Translate’s and DeepL’s API. However, due to length restrictions by the
DeepL API, the texts were segmented into sentences, then translated, and nally put back together.
e same was done for Google Translate to avoid a bias. All the textual data manipulation as
well as the translation itself was done in R. For translations with Google Translate, the translateR
package (Lucas & Tingley, 2014) was used. e package provides easy out-of-R access to the
Google Translate API. A similar function was built to translate the documents with DeepL via
their API.4
e process of the term-by-term translation was less straightforward, as the corpus had to be
converted to a DTM rst, requiring the documents to be preprocessed. e problem with most
preprocessing steps is that they are not language-independent. is is true for common procedures
like stop word removal, stemming, decompounding, or lemmatization. An aempt was made to
include as much grammatical information as possible in the DTM for the translation. us, as
lile preprocessing as possible was done before the translation. No decompounding or stemming
procedures were applied, and all the leers were kept as they were (uppercase or lowercase).
However, all 633 German documents were split into individual words (tokenization), and then
all punctuation marks (Unicode “Punctuation” [S] class), symbols (Unicode “Symbol” [S] class),
and tokens consisting only of numbers were removed. Hyphens were not removed, as that might
change the meaning of terms (e.g., “EU-Abgeordneter” [Member of the European Parliament]).
From these tokens, a DTM was created. is step, as well as the rest of the preprocessing, was done
in R using the quanteda package (Benoit et al., 2017). For the actual translation, the vocabulary
(i.e., the unique terms) was extracted from the German DTM, translated with Google Translate
using the translateR package (Lucas & Tingley, 2014) and placed back into the DTM as English
terms.
A specic feature of the German language is the concatenation of multiple words into a single
word. Because such compounds (e.g., “Klimawandel”) are less common in English, they were oen
translated as ngrams (e.g., “climate change”). To avoid systematic dierences in the vocabulary,
all the newly created ngrams in the “German” DTM were split into unigrams (e.g., “climate” and
“change”) before all further steps. In addition, duplicate terms were removed.
Apart from counting the words, the aim of preprocessing is to remove noise and to extract as
much useful information as possible by “treating words with very similar properties identically
4e R code produced for the analyses done here is available on GitHub: hps://github.com/ureber/mt-paper
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and removing words that are unnecessary to our interpretation and our model” (Lucas et al., 2015,
p. 257). Hence, the nal preprocessing steps—which were conducted on all the translated DTMs
for both studies—included the conversion of all leers to lowercase, the removal of terms with
fewer than three characters, lemmatization, the removal of stop words, and relative pruning (for
further reection on preprocessing, see Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Wiedemann, et al. 2018). e
preprocessing steps were conducted in this order. It is important to note that a dierent order
would lead to dierent results (Denny & Spirling, 2018). e conversion to all lowercase was
done for the sake of term unication. is was necessary because of words used, for example, at
the beginning of a sentence. Stop word removal and the removal of terms with fewer than three
characters (e.g., “to,” “on,” “dr,” “mp”) was done to remove terms that are extremely frequent or
unspecic and thus not helpful as indicators for a document’s content (Salton, 1991). For stop
word removal, a look-up list with the most common stop words (e.g., “from,” “aer,” “the”) as well
as stop words specic to websites (e.g., “click,” “login,” “comments”) was used. e list was put
together specically for this project. Lemmatization was done to convert inected words to their
base forms (e.g., “warming” to “warm”). Since the declination or conjugation of a word is usually
not indicative of its meaning, lemmatization is used to combine words with the same meaning
(Lucas et al., 2015). is reduces the dimension of the model input and generally improves the
results (Jacobi et al., 2016). A comprehensive look-up list with base forms of inected words was
used for the lemmatization. Finally, relative pruning was done to remove extremely rare as well
as extremely frequent terms. All terms were removed that occurred in less than 0.5% or more
than 99% of the documents, two common thresholds (e.g., Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). If there is
a theoretical interest in nding paerns of words that are used across documents, the removal
of very infrequent terms is recommended because they do not contribute much information to
the identication of document similarities (Denny & Spirling, 2018, p. 8). e removal of very
frequent terms is advisable for the same reason as the removal of stop words—they are unspecic
for a document’s content and therefore add no helpful information to the topic model.
3.2.3 e Structural Topic Model
For the analyses done here, four topic models were needed: three to compare the translation
providers/methods (study 1) and one for the cross-country comparison of the climate change
discourse (study 2). e rst three models are based on the 633 dierently translated web pages.
e fourth model is based on the entire corpus of 6,843 German, British and U.S. American web
pages.
For modeling, the structural topic model framework was used (STM; Roberts, Stewart, & Airoldi,
2016; Roberts, Stewart, Tingley, & Airoldi, 2013).5 It builds on the same principles as the la-
tent Dirichlet allocation (LDA; Blei et al., 2003)—the most common topic model in the social
5See Roberts et al. (2016, 2013) and the R package’s vignee (Roberts, Stewart, & Tingley, 2017) for a comprehensive
description of the framework’s technical details.
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sciences—but allows users to incorporate additional information and covariates into the model
(Roberts et al., 2016). ese covariates can aect either the topical prevalence or the topical
content. Topical prevalence refers to how much of a document is associated with a topic (e.g.,
German actors are more likely to speak about topic 1 than British actors). Topical content relates
to the words used to discuss a topic (e.g., German-speaking actors are more likely than English
speaking actors to use a particular word when they discuss topic 1). e advantage of the STM is
that topical prevalence or topical content is not assumed to be constant across all documents, but
rather may vary depending on its properties (Roberts et al., 2014). e STM framework, therefore,
allows both the identication of topics and the estimation of their relationships to document
properties.
Moreover, topical content covariates allow the model to “condition away systematic dierences
within the corpus that are not of primary interest” (Lucas et al., 2015, p. 263). It could be that the
translation led to minor but systematic dierences in the vocabulary of the documents. Since the
primary interest is in the actors’ use of dierent topics based on their country of action (i.e., the
big picture), small dierences in the vocabulary should not inuence the model. In this case, the
inclusion of the documents’ original language as a topical covariate allowed the STM to capture
systematic dierences in the frequency a word was used by German and English speaking actors
without aecting the overall outcome of the model. Technically this is done by dening “the
distribution over the terms associated with the dierent topics as an exponential family model,
similar to a multinominal logistic regression” (Roberts et al., 2016, p. 989). us, a topical content
covariate indicating the document’s original language was included in the multinational model
for the comparison of the climate change discourse, but not for the three models used for the
comparison of the translation providers/methods.
e modeling procedure itself was done in R using the stm package (Roberts et al., 2017) and
included the following steps. First, the optimal number of topics was evaluated. is was
not a straightforward routine, as there is not a “right” number of topics for a given corpus
or research question (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, p. 285). For both studies several models were
estimated, each with a dierent number of topics. To nd the optimal number of topics, the models
were then compared by three diagnostic indicators: their held-out likelihood (Wallach, Murray,
Salakhutdinov, & Mimno, 2009), their residuals dispersion (Taddy, 2012), and their lower bounds.
For the analysis of the climate change discourse, however, diagnostic indicators were not the
only criteria since the overall objective was to obtain the best solution in terms of interpretability
(Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Wiedemann, et al., 2018). e models’ outputs were thus also compared
qualitatively by looking at the topics’ top words (determined by their highest marginal probability).
Considering diagnostic indicators and the models’ overall interpretability, the 30-topics version
of the model was ultimately chosen for study 2. For study 1, the 40-topics solution was chosen
based on models’ diagnostic indicators.
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One challenge of topic models is that topics are abstract objects consisting of clusters of words
that likely co-occur in the corpus’s documents. To make use of them, they must be interpreted
in theoretical terms (Jacobi et al., 2016). In the climate change case studied here, topics were
examined through the theoretical lens of “same issue at the same time under similar criteria of
relevance” (Eder & Kantner, 2000, p. 315, translation by the author). e issue in this case is
climate change. us, this study approaches topics as “criteria of relevance” of the climate change
issue. is means that a topic theoretically represents a particular aspect of the climate change
discourse that can be interpreted and named. It does not mean that word clusters necessarily
represent a coherent position or frame, but they do represent at least some kind of sub-issue
(Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Jähnichen, & Pfetsch, 2018). However, not all topics are interpretable.
Some do not represent a coherent concept or meaningful aspect of the debate and are thus hard
to describe. Others are so-called boilerplate topics with no substantive meaning at all (Mimno
& Blei, 2011). Such topics were excluded from the analysis because they do not help to answer
the research questions. For the exclusion as well as for the labeling, the topic’s top words and
10 randomly sampled documents with a relatively high probability (> 0.6) of the topic were
considered.
Label Top words
Causes / eects of climate change co2, atmosphere, carbon, increase, eect, ocean, temperature, greenhouse, gas, water
Climate change evidence warm, global, temperature, chart, climate, co2, emission, year, trend, change
Climate change research climate, research, change, science, university, institute, work, policy, study, impact
Climate modeling climate, model, ipcc, prediction, study, predict, scientist, scientic, science, evidence
Climate politics climate, change, government, green, emission, country, carbon, guardian, policy, action
Climate politics and science science, climate, political, change, scientic, argument, make, claim, public, debate
Climate scepticism solar, climate, radiation, wa, sun, wuwt, model, vapor, anthony, pinterest
Doubting climate research paper, science, gore, publish, skeptic, write, review, medium, mann, michael
Economy and climate politics company, industry, group, fund, oil, report, project, airport, business, plan
Energy consumption energy, green, save, make, recycle, home, heat, reduce, waste, ecient
Energy sector energy, gas, power, wind, fuel, coal, emission, price, cost, electricity
Environmental activism wwf, work, change, campaign, climate, centre, live, business, people, sustainable
Extreme weather climate, change, report, weather, research, publish, storm, impact, extreme, read
Food / health food, science, movement, crop, environmental, ddt, permaculture, malaria, year, issue
Humanity world, people, human, life, society, change, social, future, live, idea
Melting ice ice, sea, arctic, level, rise, melt, ocean, year, glacier, polar
Science physic, space, earth, science, scientist, planet, sun, nasa, system, year
Scientic results / concensus warm, global, climate, change, scientist, report, temperature, year, world, ipcc
Temperature temperature, warm, period, year, change, climate, record, global, trend, past
U.S. environmental politics state, u.s, obama, american, epa, president, tax, federal, rule, regulation
U.S. scal policy obama, spend, house, climate, democrat, year, president, republican, make, time
Wildlife protection read, specie, climate, environment, sh, animal, green, wildlife, forest, energy
Table 3.1: Labels and top words of the multinational climate change model.
Top words are determined by their marginal highest probability.
e decision process was guided by two questions (Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Wiedemann, et al.,
2018): (1) Does the topic depict a coherent (possibly controversial) aspect of the climate change
discourse? (2) How can this aspect be described most comprehensively? If the top words and
the documents pointed in a dierent direction or only one could be interpreted meaningfully,
the topic was excluded. For the model used in study 2, eight topics were excluded, and 22 were
labeled. Table 3.1 summarizes the labels and top words for the analysis of the online climate
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change discourse in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For this model, the
German documents were translated as full-texts with DeepL.
3.2.4 Study 1: Robustness
Following De Vries et al. (2018), the vocabulary of the translated and preprocessed DTMs were
compared to obtain a detailed impression of how much the results of the two machine-translation
providers dier and whether the translation of a DTM is a valid alternative to the full-text
translation of a corpus. e rst comparison focused on the level of documents. Using the cosine
similarity, it was measured how similar the term vectors of a document are when the document
was translated as full-texts with DeepL (DL/FT), as full-texts with Google Translate (GT/FT), and
term-by-term with Google Translate (GT/DTM). Second, at the corpus level, the comparison of
the unique terms gave an impression of both how comprehensive as well as how exclusive the
vocabulary in the corresponding DTMs is.
De Vries et al. (2018) further assessed the similarity of translated corpora by comparing the results
of topic models computed on the translated corpora. is makes sense, since it ultimately depends
on the similarity of the topic models whether the conclusions drawn from the corpora are the
same. erefore the focus here was primarily on the topics’ interpretations as well as on their












Table 3.2: Top words of matched topics describing climate change as lie.
e rst step was to see which topics can be matched with each other. To do so, the probability
values of 30 top words were compared all labeled topics. Building on Niekler and Jähnichen (2012)
approach to match topic model results, the cosine similarity was used to measure the topics’
similarity. All topic pairs with a relatively high cosine similarity (> 0.4) were then examined in
depth. is means that the previously assigned labels as well as the top words of the topics were
compared qualitatively with each other. If two topics described the same thematic aspect of the
climate change discourse, they were considered a match.
Table 3.2 shows an example for three matched topics. When looking at the top words, it can be
stated that they describe the same thematic aspect of the discourse. is impression is conrmed
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by the measured cosine similarities. e resulting similarity of 0.859 for the Google Translate
(GT/FT) and the DeepL (DL/FT) translations indicates a very good match. e similarity of the
GT/DTM’s topic with the others, however, not quite as good. e cosine similarity is 0.565 for the
match with the DL/FT’s topic and 0.626 for topic of the GT/FT model.
e second step focused on the bigger picture by looking at the number of matched topics as
well as at the average cosine similarity. e more topics could be matched, the more similar
two models are. Ideally, each topic could only be matched with one topic from the other model
(unique match). In practice, however, a topic was oen matched multiple times (multi-match). e
interpretation of such multi-matches is dicult, as they indicate both similarity and dierence
of the compared models at the same time. Since the reason for multi-matches lies not only in
dierent corpora (due to dierent translations), but also in the topic models’ generative process
(cf. Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Wiedemann, et al., 2018), only those pairs out of the multi-matches
with the highest cosine similarity (rst matches) as well as the unique matches were considered
in the nal step of the study.
is step concentrated on the question whether the matched topics have the same prevalence in
the documents of the translated corpora. Or in other words: Is the distribution of the matched
topics the same across the documents? is question is central, since most studies using topic
models just rely on the topic proportions to draw conclusions from a corpus. As suggested by
De Vries et al. (2018), the matched topics’ distributions over all documents were correlated with
each other to determine their similarity.
3.2.5 Study 2: Integrability
To measure the discourse convergence of the climate change discourses in Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, the multinational topic model was analyzed in two ways: (1) a
comparison of the mean topic proportions per country, (2) a comparison of the relative frequency
of topics as the top topics per country. e top topic is the topic with the highest average
probability over all web pages of an actor. In the rst case, dierences between countries were
tested for signicance using ANOVA. In the second case, Fisher’s exact test was used due to the
occasionally small number of cases in which a topic was the top topic.
e topic model results are generally discussed directly at the individual document level (i.e.,
web page level) because they are the main unit for the calculation of the model (i.e., “bag of
words”). In this study, however, the question is whether actors in Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States discuss the same aspects of climate change on their websites. us, the
focus is on the actors’ websites rather than on the individual web pages. In this case, the actor
denition includes all individuals or organizations who are represented in the sample with at least
one web page. Actors can therefore be political actors (e. g. governments, oces, parties), civil
society actors (e.g., environmental organizations, research institutions, churches, foundations,
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citizens’ initiatives, blogs), media, or companies. For the analysis, the individual web pages were
aggregated to actors based on the manual coding of the “about us” pages. e aggregation was
done by calculating the mean topic probability over all web pages of an actor. In contrast to
summing up the topic probabilities, calculating the mean maintains the bag-of-words logic on the
actor level and therefore allows a direct comparison of actors further in the analytical process.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Study 1: Robustness
e rst comparison to assess whether the dierent translation providers/methods produce similar
results is that of the translated documents. For each document, the cosine similarity between
the word vectors (i.e., “bag of words”) of the dierent translated versions was calculated. For
two identical translations, the cosine similarity would be 1. If no words in both translations are
identical, the similarity is 0.
Figure 3.1: Distributions of cosine similarity between documents per translation method pair.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of cosine similarities between document pairs (n = 633) for every
translation method pair. e gure shows that Google Translate (GT/FT) and DeepL (DL/FT)
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produce quite similar results when whole web pages are translated (M = 0.791, SD = 0.117).
However, if only the single words of the DTM were translated (GT/DTM), the similarities between
the documents are smaller, although still respectable. An ANOVA showed that the dierences
between the pairings’ distributions are signicant (F(1, 1897) = 216.6, p < 0.001).6 Interestingly,
the results of the DL/FT and the GT/DTM translation are closer together (M = 0.670, SD = 0.120)
than the GT/FT and the GT/DTM translation (M = 0.606, SD = 0.158), even though the DTM
translation was also done with Google Translate.
Figure 3.2: Unique terms in the translated and preprocessed DTMs and their overlap.
A second way to compare the translations on a corpus level is to compare the vocabulary in the
respective DTMs. A larger vocabulary means that thematic structures are represented in a more
detailed and thus probably more accurate way. Furthermore, if large parts of the vocabulary
match, the texts have been translated correspondingly. As shown in Figure 3.2, the vocabularies
in the full-text translations are slightly larger than in the term-by-term translation of the DTM.
e full-text translation with DeepL (DL/FT) produced the vocabulary with the most unique
terms (features; 7,372), followed by the full-text translation with Google Translate (GT/FT: 6,978).
e term-by-term translation with Google Translate (GT/DTM) produced the result with the
smallest number of unique terms (6,843). e number of overlapping features is also larger for
the two full-text translations (6,161 terms) than for the full-text translations versus term-by-term
translation (GT/FT vs. GT/DTM: 5,719; DL/FT vs. GT/DTM: 5,533 terms). Not surprisingly, but
6e documents at the lower end of the le tails are mainly longer blog posts with many special characters and
unconventional punctuation. In such cases, sentence decomposition oen led to sentence fragments, which were then
translated dierently by the translation services.
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other than above, the results of the GT/FT and the GT/DTM translations are closer to each other
than to the DL/FT translation. However, the DeepL translation is the most detailed and thus
probably the most accurate.
e apparent reason for the smaller vocabulary of the GT/DTM translation is that words with
several meanings (depending on the context) are lumped together and then translated with one
and the same term. Part of the semantic information is therefore lost in the process of a DTM
translation. Whether this causes major divergences in the corpus can be checked by comparing
the results of the topic models.
e rst comparison of the topic model results denotes to the number of matched topics. For
every translated corpus a model with 40 topics was computed. e models were then interpreted
as described above. For the DL/FT model a total of 29 topics could be interpreted and labeled
based on their top words and a selection of documents. e same was true for a total of 28 topics
in the GT/FT model and 29 topics in the GT/DTM model. us, there were no notable dierences
in the interpretability of the three models.
Figure 3.3: Matched topics.
Of the 29 respectively 28 topics a total of 24 could be matched in the DL/FT versus GT/FT
comparison. However, 12 pairings were multi-matches (i.e., one or both topics of the pair is also
involved in another match). If only the pairings with the best cosine similarity (rst matches) as
well as the unique matches were considered, 15 topics could be matched. For the DL/FT versus
GT/DTM comparison a total of 21 topics could be matched, but only 14 as rst/unique matches.
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Finally, for the GT/FT versus GT/DTM comparison 20 topics could be matched, 16 of them as
rst/unique matches. Figure 3.3 illustrates these ndings.
If the multi-matches are included in the picture, a considerable part of the interpretable topics
could be matched in all three cases. Comparing the two full-text models (DL/FT vs. GT/FT), only
4 respectively 5 topics have no equivalent in the other model. No maer which of the two models
is used, the overall picture regarding topical content is very similar. Not quite as good is the result
when comparing the full-text models with the GT/DTM model. However, in both cases more than
two thirds of the labeled topics could be matched. e majority of the topics therefore point in
the same substantive direction. If only the rst matches are considered, the dierences between
the models vanish, as only about half of the topics could be matched in all three comparisons.
Figure 3.4: Cosine similarity of matched topics (rst matches).
When looking at the rst matches more closely, however, it becomes clear that those of the
full-text models (DL/FT vs. GT/FT) have a higher mean cosine similarity (M = 0.793, SD = 0.121)
than when they are compared to the GT/DTM model (DL/FT vs. GT/DTM: M = 0.703, SD = 0.142;
GT/FT vs. GT/DTM: M = 0.691, SD = 0.137). Figure 3.4 illustrates this. With regard to topical
content it can therefore be said: e two full-text models are more similar to each other than they
are to the GT/DTM model.
But are the matched topics equally important for the same documents? To measure this, the
individual topics’ proportions over all web pages were correlated per translation method pair.
Figure 3.5 shows the overall picture. e descriptive gures are summarized in Table 3.3. With
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mean correlation coecients between 0.6 and 0.7 in all three cases, most matched topics correlate
quite well. Although the resulting coecients are wider distributed in the comparisons of the full-
text models with the GT/DTM model, the results do not dier signicantly from the comparison
of the two full-text model (ANOVA: F(1, 43) = 0.405, p = 0.569). Looking at the topical prevalence
of the topics, it can thus be said that the conclusions drawn from the dierent models would be
quite similar.
Figure 3.5: Topical prevalence correlations.
Translation method pair N Mean SD Min Max
DL/FT vs. GL/FT 15 0.696 0.209 0.384 0.990
DL/FT vs. GL/DTM 14 0.633 0.231 0.174 0.907
GL/FT vs. GL/DTM 16 0.635 0.233 0.032 0.922
Table 3.3: Descriptive gures for topical prevalence correlations.
To sum things up, the dierences between the two full-text translations are small. e accuracy
of DeepL and Google Translate seems to be similar for full-text translations. Due to the larger
vocabulary, DeepL may be slightly more precise than Google Translate, but it is safe to say that
the choice of translation service plays a minor role. More important is the choice of the translation
method, as the dierences between the full-text translations and the DTM translation are bigger
than between the full-text translations. However, the dierences are not of a fundamental nature.
Both the majority of documents as well as topics point in the same substantive direction for DTM
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and full-text translations. e conclusion of Lucas et al. (2015) can therefore be conrmed that two
researchers using a DTM and a full-text translation would reach the same substantive conclusions.
us, the translation of the individual terms of a DTM can be a useful shortcut for the translation
of larger corpora. Wherever possible, however, the whole texts should be translated. e smaller
vocabulary of the DTM translation is a clear indicator that information is lost due to the previous
preprocessing of the documents. e size of the vocabulary is also the reason, why the DeepL
translation was used for the following analysis of the climate change discourse.
3.3.2 Study 2: Integrability
Figure 3.6: Mean topic proportion (over all actors).
e rst comparison to measure whether actors in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States discuss climate change “under similar criteria of relevance” uses the mean topic proportions.
Figure 3.6 gives an overview of the topic proportion based on the mean topic proportions of
the actors. Looking at the German actors, it is noticeable that climate change research plays an
important role in their communication. Not only because the corresponding topic has by far the
highest probability, but also because other “scientic” topics, such as the causes and eects of
climate change, the melting of ice, the temperature, or scientic results have high mean values.
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Other topics frequently encountered by German actors include environmental activism as well as
economic issues (especially the energy industry). U.S. American actors also give particular weight
to scientic aspects of the climate change issues (causes and eects of climate change, climate
change research, the temperature as well as scientic results, and the scientic consensus). Other
important sub-issues are the U.S. environmental politics and the energy sector. British actors,
nally, tend to place more emphasis on politics. Topics such as climate politics, economy and
climate politics, the (regulation of) the energy sector as well as environmental activism have
remarkably high average proportions. Climate research also plays a crucial role for British actors,
albeit not a very important one.
With regard to dierences between the countries, an ANOVA shows that most of the expected topic
probabilities are actually dierent (see Appendix B, chapter 3.5.2 for a table with the test results).
British actors emphasize political as well as economic aspects (climate politics, environmental
activism, economy and climate politics, energy sector) signicantly more than actors in Germany
and the United States. Climate science, on the other hand, appears to be a rather German sub-
issues (climate change research, extreme weather). Not surprisingly, U.S. environmental politics
is on average more important to U.S. actors than to others.
Figure 3.7: Relative frequency of topics as top topic.
43
A clearer picture results if only the top topics are considered that have the highest mean proportion
over all web pages of an actor. is simplication is helpful, as each document theoretically
consists of each topic. Figure 3.7 shows the relative frequency of topics as the top topics for
the three countries. Germany again shows the highest interest in climate change research. e
impression gained before is also conrmed by the British actors, whose main concern is oen
political in nature (climate politics, energy sector, environmental activism, economy and climate
politics, humanity). Particularly interesting is the picture that arises for U.S. actors. Clearer than
in the analysis of the mean values, the top topics show a broad interest in fundamental questions
on climate change. is holds true for topics such as causes and eects of climate change, scientic
results and consensus as well as the temperature (trend). A substantial proportion of the actors
are mainly concerned with U.S. environmental politics.
Not every topic that is typical of a country’s discourse is also a unique feature. e sub-issue of
economy and climate politics is relatively important in the United Kingdom, but it is not more
important than in the two other countries. However, using Fisher’s exact test (see Appendix
C, chapter 3.5.3 for a table with all the test results), some dierences in the distribution can be
identied. According to the test results, climate change research can be dened as a German topic,
whereas climate politics, the energy sector, and environmental activism appear to be typically
British. Typical U.S. American topics are the causes and eects of climate change, the scientic
consensus, and the U.S. environmental politics. Nevertheless, the public discourses about climate
change in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are not fundamentally dierent.
Since there are very few topics (U.S. environmental politics, climate skepticism) that solely belong
to actors of only one country, the observed dierences relate mostly to the salience with which a
topic is discussed, and less to the question of whether a topic is discussed at all. Actors in both
countries therefore discuss climate change “under similar criteria of relevance” (Eder & Kantner,
2000, p. 315), but they do not always aribute the same importance to them. It can therefore be
said that the online climate change discourse in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Unites
States partly converges, but each of them also has its clear national characteristics.
3.4 Discussion
e availability of aordable and quickly improving machine-translation services introduces
new opportunities for comparative communication research. With online translation services
such as Google Translate and DeepL, multilingual text corpora can be easily transformed into
monolingual corpora, which can then be analyzed with, for example, topic models. In this paper,
the potential of such a combined approach has been assessed, both from a methodological and
substantive point of view.
From a methodological point of view, it can be said that when texts are translated for an analysis
with topic models, similar results can be obtained no maer which translation service (Google
44
Translate vs. DeepL) or method (full-text vs. DTM) is used. Looking at the big picture—and
given that the topic modeling procedure is kept unchanged—the combination of topic models
and machine translation therefore appears to be quite robust. Looking closer, however, it turns
out that the choice of translation service is less of a factor than the choice of method. While the
full-text translations of Google Translate and DeepL are relatively similar, they dier more from
the translation of the individual terms of a DTM. is shows that machine translation services, just
like humans, use the context in which a word is wrien in a text to determine its exact meaning.
Nevertheless, the comparisons have shown that the results of the DTM translation are not too
far from those of the full-text translations. To translate the individual terms of a DTM is thus an
acceptable and cost-eective alternative to obtain a monolingual corpus from a multilingual one.
For beer results, however, the rst choice should always be the translation of entire documents.
To examined whether topic modeling coupled with machine translation can be linked to existing
theories and work from the eld of comparative communication research (i.e., the substantive
point of view), the online climate change discourses in Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America was compared with regard to their transnationality. For the analysis,
the German web pages were translated with DeepL as a whole. e results indicate that there
are parallels as well as divergences between the debates in the countries. is is consistent
with what is known about the climate change discourse in oine mass media. Ivanova (2017)
has shown that the media agenda for climate change is similar in all three countries, but there
are dierences in the importance of dierent topics. Similarities to the ndings described here
are particularly apparent in the greater emphasis on scientic descriptions in Germany and the
stronger accentuation of political topics in the United Kingdom (cf. Ivanova, 2017). One potential
explanation for the dierent national priorities as well as for potential parallels between national
online and oine agendas could be the national political agenda (cf. Grundmann & Sco, 2014).
But it must be le to others to investigate this further.
is study showed that machine translation and topic models are a powerful couple when it
comes to the analysis of multilingual corpora. Even in large amounts of text, a combined approach
makes it possible to identify and compare thematic structures across language boundaries with
relative ease. e cross-sectional comparison of two cases made here, is of course only one
possible application. Longitudinal comparisons, as well as comparisons between several cases
(i.e., languages, countries, and document types), are also possible. Moreover, content information
obtained from topic models can also be combined with other information, such as network data.
is could contribute to a beer understanding of underlying discursive mechanisms, especially
in the case of online communication. Topic models coupled with machine translation thus is a
valuable addition to the toolbox of comparative communication researchers.
However, a combined use topic models and machine translation is not a cure-all. First, topic
models—with or without translation—are hardly the right tool for in-depth analyses of discourses.
eir strength is the detection of relatively coarse thematic structures in large text corpora, but
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they are blind to more complex thematic structures, such as sentiments or arguments. us, if
the focus is on more complex linguistic structures, other, possibly manual methods of content
analysis are required. Second, topic models must be put on a solid theoretical foundation in order
to be interpreted meaningfully.
ird, it must always be asked whether the analyzed texts should be sent to servers of online
translation services. When public communication is studied, as here, this is usually not a problem,
but when it comes to private communication, such as interviews, leers or e-mails, protecting
the privacy of the people involved must be an issue. In such cases, online translation services
should be avoided.
With regard to the two studies presented here, there are further limitations which must be
addressed. In particular, it is not possible to determine whether the dierent translations
providers/methods have caused systematic biases (e.g., by translating into British/U.S. American
English). e validity of the translation can not be assessed with the corpus of web documents
used here, as there is no benchmark available. e same applies for the accuracy of the translation.
It is not certain that the larger vocabulary of the DL/FT translation actually means a more accurate
translation, although a direct but unsystematic comparison of randomly selected documents from
both full-text translations supports this assumption. In order to be sure, however, a comparison
with a reference translation (“gold standard”) is necessary (cf. De Vries et al., 2018).
Another restriction relates to the languages studied here. German to English translations are
believed to be quite good in comparison to translations between other languages, as they are both
Germanic languages and because there is much training data available (e.g., human-translated
transcripts of parliament debates). Although Lucas et al. (2015) have reported similar ndings
for documents wrien in Chinese and Arabic, further studies have to show whether the results
reported here are also valid for other languages.
It should also be borne in mind that other languages may pose other challenges—such as the
ngrams in the German to English translation done here—and that the proposed procedure may
therefore require some adjustments if it is used with other languages. It is also important to note
again that changes in the preprocessing as well as in the modeling procedure may well aect the
results (cf. Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Wiedemann, et al., 2018).
e nal restriction relates to the types of models that can be reliably computed with machine-
translated texts. Possible inaccuracies caused by the machine translation are less of a concern with
bag-of-words topic models due to the relatively rigid preprocessing procedure and their focus on
coarse semantic structures. Whether machine translation is also useful for models that focus on
ner semantic structures (e.g., arguments), and thus depend on correct syntactical structures, is
uncertain. erefore, future research should also focus on the usefulness of machine translation
for linguistically more sophisticated methods.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Appendix A: Webcrawler Starting Points




Heinrich Boell Stiung hp://klima-der-gerechtigkeit.boellblog.org
Greenpeace Germany hp://www.greenpeace.de/themen/klima/nachrichten














Friends of the Earth UK hp://www.foe.org/projects/climate-and-energy
WWF UK hp://www.wwf.org.uk/what we do/
tackling climate change
Skeptics
e Global Warming Policy Foundation hp://thegwpf.org











e Heartland Institute hp://heartland.org/issues/environment
Climate Depot hp://www.climatedepot.com
C3 Headlines hp://www.c3headlines.com
Was Up With at? hp://wasupwiththat.com
Table 3.4: Starting points for the snowball-sampling of websites.
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3.5.2 Appendix B: ANOVA Results
ANOVA results for the comparison of the expected topic probabilities over all actors by country.
Topic F(1,813) p
Causes / eects of climate change 8.895 0.003 **
Climate change evidence 20.003 < 0.001 ***
Climate change research 17.994 < 0.001 ***
Climate modeling 5.455 0.020 *
Climate politics 89.937 < 0.001 ***
Climate politics and science 3.663 0.056
Climate scepticism 24.673 < 0.001 ***
Doubting climate research 2.093 0.148
Economy and climate politics 18.649 < 0.001 ***
Energy consumption 27.207 < 0.001 ***
Energy sector 14.213 < 0.001 ***
Environmental activism 34.808 < 0.001 ***
Extreme weather 34.937 < 0.001 ***
Food / health 12.698 < 0.001 ***
Humanity 24.584 < 0.001 ***
Melting ice 9.949 0.002 **
Science 4.301 0.038 *
Scientic results / concensus 16.189 < 0.001 ***
Temperature 13.234 < 0.001 ***
U.S. environmental politics 17.94 < 0.001 ***
U.S. scal policy 1.721 0.190
Wildlife protection 0.051 0.823
Table 3.5: ANOVA results.
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3.5.3 Appendix C: Fisher’s Exact Test Results
Fisher’s exact test results for every topic as top topic by country.
Topic p
Causes / eects of climate change < 0.001 ***
Climate change evidence 0.029 *
Climate change research < 0.001 ***
Climate modeling 0.463
Climate politics < 0.001 ***
Climate politics and science 0.401
Climate scepticism 1
Doubting climate research 0.013 *
Economy and climate politics 0.232
Energy consumption 0.005 **
Energy sector 0.008 **
Environmental activism < 0.001 ***
Extreme weather 0.003 **
Food / health 0.321
Humanity 0.144
Melting ice 0.044 *
Science 0.819
Scientic results / concensus < 0.001 ***
Temperature < 0.001 ***
U.S. environmental politics < 0.001 ***
U.S. scal policy 0.153
Wildlife protection 0.069
Table 3.6: Fisher’s Exact Test results.
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Chapter 4
How climate change skeptics (try to)
spread their ideas: Using
computational methods to assess the
resonance among skeptics’ and legacy
media
Abstract: We study the discursive resonance of online climate skepticism in traditional media in
Germany, a country where climate skeptics lack public prestige and thus form a political counter-
movement. We thereby dierentiate two temporal dynamics: resonance can be continuous or
selective, based on the exploitation of specic events. Beyond, we test whether such resonance
is higher within the conservative media. We rely on news value theory to shed light on the
mechanism facilitating or hindering such resonance and identify three indicators for resonance:
frames, positions and actors. Using various computational methods as well as qualitative case
studies, we examine the skeptical and traditional media discourses over a period of two years.
Our analysis shows that there is no continuous resonance. However, our data reveal selective
resonance: skeptics’ manage to exploit specic events pushing their frames and positions onto
traditional media’s agenda. ereby, conservative media did not give greater resonance to climate
skeptical voices whereas they resort to downplaying the issue by allocating less space to it.
Note: is chapter is a manuscript submied to PLOS ONE as Adam*, Reber*, Häussler*, and
Schmid-Petri (under review). *e authors contributed equally
Funding: is publication was created in the context of the Research Unit ”Political Commu-
nication in the Online World” (FOR 1381), Subproject 07 (applicant S.A.), which is funded by
the German Research Foundation (DFG, hps://www.dfg.de, project number 155794648). e
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subproject is also funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF, hps://www.snf.ch,
project number 100017E-154100). e funders had no role in study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Data and code: e data underlying the results presented in the study is available to all interested
researchers upon request via the open repository of GESIS (hps://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.5183).
Restrictions apply because the online text data examined cannot be completely anonymized. e
R code produced for the analyses is publicly available on GitHub (hps://github.com/ikmb-unibe/
coab so2).
4.1 Introduction
Anthropogenic climate change is one of the most fundamental problems the world is facing, and
it presents a threat to the global community (IPCC, 2014). Although there is scientic consensus
that climate change is occurring, that the rise in temperature is predominantly due to human
activity, that it has severe consequences for ecological systems, and that only a sharp reduction
in CO2 emissions can limit climate change, political eorts have been lacking. One reason for
the impasse is the counter-mobilization of climate skeptics (Dunlap & McCright, 2015), who
have run campaigns that cast doubt on the scientic consensus and those responsible for it—the
climate scientists. Climate skeptics and their spokespersons in the media and politics have been
stunningly successful in the US, where not only conservative citizens forcefully reject climate
politics (Tesler, 2017) but also the Trump administration. By contrast, in most European countries
those defending the climate consensus, the climate advocates, (still) dominate political institutions
(e.g., Häussler et al., 2016), traditional mass media (e.g., Schmid-Petri, 2017), and public opinion
(e.g., Metag, Füchslin, & Schäfer, 2017; Tranter & Booth, 2015) with climate skeptics being in the
role of counter-movements (Fraser, 1990).
Such counter-movements, however, use another venue, the internet, to push their ideas (Schäfer,
2012). Here, climate skeptics are more active and visible compared to climate advocates in
European countries, building connections with conservative media and transnational allies (Adam,
Häussler, et al., 2019; Elgesem, Steskal, & Diakopoulos, 2015), and even imposing their frames
onto the agenda of climate advocates (Adam, Schmid-Petri, Reber, & Häussler, 2019). Yet, so far,
research has hardly analyzed (for an exception, see Farrell, 2016b) whether there is any connection
between climate skeptical online communication and the coverage in traditional media and politics
(for this research decit, see Adam, Häussler, et al., 2019; Sharman, 2014). e neglect of studying
discursive resonance among venues is all the more surprising as research for the US convincingly
shows that the discourse in the traditional channels inuences public perceptions (Tesler, 2017):
polarized media discourses lead to polarized public perceptions. Beyond, research so far has
primarily focused on the US where climate skeptics are strong and prestigious. We, however, focus
51
on climate skeptics as a political counter-movement and ask: How is the discursive resonance of
online climate skepticism shaped in traditional media when climate skeptics lack public prestige?
is study seeks to make three contributions. First, our study connects venues that have mostly
been examined separately, as research has focused either on climate skeptics’ online communica-
tion (e.g., Adam, Häussler, et al., 2019; Elgesem et al., 2015; Sharman, 2014; for a summary, see
Schäfer, 2012), or on their visibility in traditional media (e.g., Boyko & Boyko, 2004; Grundmann
& Sco, 2014; Schmid-Petri, 2017; Vu, Liu, & Tran, 2019), or on their strength in parliamentary
seings (e.g., Fisher, Waggle, & Leifeld, 2013; Häussler et al., 2016). By comparing the discourses
across venues, we contribute to a beer understanding of the conditions that lead to greater
resonance of counter-movement ideas in mainstream discourses. Second, as climate skeptics are
organized across national borders (Dunlap & McCright, 2015), we take into account the potential
transnational ow of ideas, via the web, into national arenas. Finally, we apply computational
approaches to the analysis of the core of political contests. ey allow—in contrast to manual
techniques—to study discursive resonance among dierent venues, outlets and over longer-time
periods and thus grasp dierent temporal dynamics of resonance as well as dierent paerns of
resonance among outlets.
To answer our research question, we rst look at climate change skeptics as political counter-
movement that lacks public prestige. We then turn to the theoretical mechanisms by which these
political counter-movements may resonate with traditional media and then develop indicators to
measure such resonance. Before turning to the results, we elaborate on the methods employed
and elaborate why we focus on Germany. e paper concludes with discussing the implications
of our study.
4.1.1 Climate skeptics as political counter-movement
Following Rahmstorf (2004), climate skeptics either fully deny or cast doubt on the fact that global
warming is taking place (trend skepticism), that humans are the main drivers of it (aribution
skepticism), and/or that climate change is leading to severe consequences (impact skepticism). In
addition, climate skeptics may also cast doubt on those producing scientic evidence (consensus
skepticism, see e.g., Engels, Hüther, Schäfer, & Held, 2013) or may question the relevance of
binding policy regulations (policy skepticism, see e.g., Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Van Rensburg,
2015). Previous research has shown that climate skepticism is oen linked to certain worldviews
and beliefs, such as conservatism and the support for free unregulated markets (Cook, 2016;
Dunlap & McCright, 2011). Climate skepticism, however, is more than an individual aitude.
Climate skeptics in the US have built what Dunlap and McCright (2011) call a “climate change
denial machine” (p. 147), in which conservative politicians, media, and bloggers work hand in
hand with think tanks and interest groups.
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While climate skepticism has been characterized as a counter-movement (Boussalis & Coan, 2016;
Brulle, 2014; Dunlap & McCright, 2015)—or counter-coalition (Adam, Häussler, et al., 2019) based
on its counter-status to scientic results (Oreskes, 2004)—the political status of climate skeptics
varies greatly between countries. ey are far from being a minority in the US, which has been
cited as a country where climate change denial has progressed to a point of becoming the ocial
presidential doctrine; but other countries such as Norway or Australia also show strong forms
of climate skepticism (e.g., Engels et al., 2013; Tranter & Booth, 2015). However, in countries
like Germany, climate change skeptics are more marginal. In such countries, they are political
counter-movements in the sense of Fraser (1990): that are groups in society that put forward a
minority position and, as a consequence, are excluded from the mainstream debate.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, most research on climate skepticism focus on the US case (for a critique,
see Engels et al., 2013)—the country in which climate skeptics are strongest and hardly excluded
from mainstream debates. For the US, the climate change denial machine is well described (Brulle,
2014; Dunlap & McCright, 2015; Farrell, 2016a, 2016b), with detailed ndings on climate skeptics’
appearances in the media (e.g., Boyko & Boyko, 2004; Carmichael, Brulle, & Huxster, 2017;
Schmid-Petri, Adam, Schmucki, & Häussler, 2017), in the (English-speaking) online world (e.g.,
Boussalis & Coan, 2016; Elgesem et al., 2015; Sharman, 2014), and in politics (e.g., Fisher et al.,
2013). If we turn, however, to those countries in which climate skeptics are still political counter-
movements, our knowledge is limited. While some research focused on appearances of skeptics
in traditional media (oen in comparison to the US; e.g., Gavin & Mashall, 2011; Grundmann
& Sco, 2014; Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015; Painter & Ashe, 2012; Schmid-Petri, 2017), only few
studies analyzed the presence of climate change skeptics in parliamentary arenas (Häussler et al.,
2016). Other research has focused on skeptics’ online communication in these countries (Adam,
Häussler, et al., 2019; Adam, Schmid-Petri, et al., 2019; Gavin & Mashall, 2011; Schäfer, 2012). Yet,
to our knowledge, research has failed to study how separated the political counter-movement still
is or whether we can observe discursive resonance between counter-movements debates (mostly
conducted online) and mainstream discourses.
Research so far has remained primarily on a descriptive level, focusing on the degree of climate
skepticism in dierent venues. Bringing these venues together seems all the more necessary as
Fraser (1990) has already pointed out that counter-movements follow two goals: rough their
internal communication they develop a group identity, whereas their external communication is
directed towards the mainstream public. Investigating the connection between climate skeptics’
online discourses and the wider public is all the more important as research has shown that
climate skeptics fully exploit the aordance provided by the internet, regardless of their status in
traditional arenas (e.g., Adam, Häussler, et al., 2019; Adam, Schmid-Petri, et al., 2019; Boussalis &
Coan, 2016; Gavin & Mashall, 2011; Sharman, 2014); they can bypass journalistic gatekeepers, and
directly connect with like-minded others across national borders. However, whether their strength
in online communication maers for other arenas is still to be shown. is requires the study
of the intersection of discourses between dierent venues (for this desideratum, see also Etling,
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Kelly, Faris, & Palfrey, 2010; Grundmann & Sco, 2014). eoretically, thereby three scenarios are
possible: if discourses remain separated, the public is fragmented into mainstream and counter-
public. If discourses resonate which each other, it might well be that counter debates take up
ideas of the mainstream. With the omnipresence of the mainstream debates, such resonance is
quite likely. However, what is politically more relevant and thus of uer interest to us, is the
more unlikely case that political counter-movements manage to resonate within the mainstream.
Research clearly shows that such actors do not have routine access to established channels. eir
success therefore depends largely on their resonance in the mainstream discourse (Benne, 1990;
Kriesi, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 1997).
4.1.2 Political counter-movements and mechanisms for media resonance
To beer understand the mechanisms that lead to discursive resonance we employ a dual per-
spective that takes into account the activities of the climate skeptical counter-movement and the
working routines of media coverage. Counter-movements such as climate skeptics seek public
visibility to gain a voice in political debates and aect their outcome (Fraser, 1990). Even in
hybrid communication environments (Chadwick, 2013), traditional media coverage still plays a
crucial role in amplifying voices of actors, their positions and viewpoints. Being at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis established actors, counter-movement actors rely on discursive strategies to pursue their
goals, knowing that they t all the beer into the news cycle the more they adapt to the narrative
needs and working routines of the media (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993).
According to news value theory, journalists evaluate events based on specic professional selection
criteria—the news factors—with regard to their worthiness of publication and prominence in the
coverage (e.g., Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Kepplinger, 2008; Schulz, 1976; Shoemaker, 1996). In the
case of climate change, one of the strategies pursued by climate skeptics is to voice doubt about
fundamental aspects such as climate science, as this ties readily to the news factor “conict”,
increases the newsworthiness of the coverage and thus their chance of being included in news
reports (Boyko & Boyko, 2004). It has already been argued that the news factor “conict”
eases the resonance of skeptic ideas within mainstream journalistic debate (Boyko & Boyko,
2004). Beyond this, we may argue that the news factor “surprise” pushes skeptics’ ideas onto the
agendas. e downside of this strategy is that it risks losing much of its newsworthiness aer a
while, unless climate skeptics succeed in introducing new, unexpected perspectives to the debate
that emphasize the news factor “surprise”. Finally, climate skeptics can aempt to rely on the
prestige of some of the members of the counter-movement and thus emphasize the news factor
“status/elite”.
In countries where climate skeptics are still a minority movement and do not command the
necessary status, geing media visibility is less likely for them. is prestige factor is all the more
important as research strongly shows that legacy media have a bias towards the elites (Benne,
1990; Wolfsfeld, 1997). With regard to climate change skeptics, we can thus ask:
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RQ1: How is the discursive resonance of online climate skepticism shaped in traditional media
coverage when climate change skeptics lack public prestige?
As we have seen above, news value theory suggests that the more news factors are aached to an
event or issue and the stronger they are, the higher the chance that it is taken up by the media.
ereby, media coverage is driven by two dierent temporal dynamics. First, some news factors
grant continuous media resonance. is is most likely the case for actors commanding a high level
of prestige as the news factor “status/elite” describes a continuous (social and) discursive quality.
Furthermore, prestigious actors on the climate skeptical side would allow the counter-movement
to promote the position and their perspectives. Second and in contrast to this, counter-movements
might rely on the creation of specic events—or their exploitation, to generate selective media
resonance. e news factor “surprise” is clearly related to this discursive strategy. We are thus
interested which types of resonance we observe in countries where climate skeptics lack prestige
and thus ask:
RQ2: Is there rather a continuous or a selective congruence between the online communication of
climate skeptics and traditional media coverage?
Finally, researchers have started to question whether news factors are perceived similarly among
dierent news outlets (e.g., Kepplinger, 2008). is so-called “two-component” theory assumes
that news factors as characteristics of events are perceived dierently by journalists depending on
the political orientation of the outlets. In the US for instance conservative media ascribe greater
news value to the ideas of climate skeptics (Boussalis & Coan, 2016; Dunlap & McCright, 2011;
Feldman, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2012; Painter & Ashe, 2012). is conservative
alliance structure has also been shown for countries in which counter-movements still have a
minority status. Here, specic conservative newspapers publish skeptics’ claims (Schmid-Petri,
2017), and skeptics closely connect via hyperlinks to these right-wing media outlets (Adam,
Häussler, et al., 2019). Consequently, our study examines the following question:
RQ3: Is there a special connection with regard to the discursive resonance between climate
skeptics and conservative media?
4.1.3 Political counter-movements and indicators for media resonance
To determine the degree of congruence between the online communication of the climate skeptical
counter-movement and traditional media coverage, and how it develops over time, we distinguish
three dierent discursive dimensions (Pfetsch et al., 2013): (1) issues and frames, (2) the positions
articulated, and (3) the visibility of actors. e more we see frames, positions and actors converge
between the two venues, the more we can speak of a discursive resonance. If we see that skeptic
frames, positions and actors resonate with the mainstream, the plausibility is high that the counter-
movement has succeeded in spreading their ideas; whereas if frames, positions and actors from
the mainstream turn more prominent in skeptics’ discourse, the opposite is the case. However,
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the methods employed in this paper, do not allow us to draw any direct conclusion as to causal
direction.
Skeptical issues and frames: Following Fraser (1990), counter-movements are excluded from
mainstream debate. Consequently, one of their central goals is to make their issues and frames
visible to a wider public. From a classical agenda-building perspective (Cobb, Ross, & Ross, 1976)
this means that counter-movements seek to raise awareness of those issues that are important
for them and try to frame debates from their viewpoint. In well-established issues, where the
agenda is largely set by traditional media and political institutions, counter-movements primarily
seek to re-frame the debate by promoting alternative views on an issue such as climate change.
ey aempt to shi “central organizing idea[s] or story line[s] that provide [. . . ] meaning to an
unfolding strip of events [. . . ] e frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of
the issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143).
On the thematic level, climate skeptics do this by sowing doubt where there is (scientic) consensus,
with the aim to draw climate advocates into a debate where contrarian positions might gain
the upper hand (Lewandowski, Oreskes, Risbey, Newell, & Smithson, 2015). Studies for the US
(Farrell, 2016b) have shown that a positive semantic relation between climate skeptic’s online
communication and traditional media coverage may occur, documenting the responsiveness of
the media to contrarian ideas and thus the success of this strategy. In this perspective, an increase
of skeptics’ frames on the media agenda might be taken as an indicator for discursive resonance
independent of the fact, whether media counter-argue these frames or not. Pure visibility of
frames maers (Ellinas, 2010).
Skeptical positions: Frames are only part of the discursive structure of a debate; equally important
is the question whose position is being covered by the media. Aer all, climate skeptical frames
can just as well be reported from a critical viewpoint that eectively undermines their credibility.
When for instance climate skeptics succeed in provoking a debate about the uncertainty of
scientic results (which is a classic skeptics’ frame, see Adam, Schmid-Petri, et al., 2019), mass
media may decide to give voice to mainstream scientists who contest this frame. Similarly,
journalists might not follow climate skeptical framing, but include their counter-position.
Climate skeptical participants in debates: In addition to frames and positions, counter-movements
aempt to promote specic representatives of their cause, in an aempt to expand the range of
legitimate participants in the debate. ese actors gain visibility in two ways, either as speakers or
addressees. In the rst case, they may be spokespersons who relate the view of a skeptical think
tank. is form of visibility is closely associated with the positional dimension introduced above.
In such a seing, journalists use the counter-movement’s representatives as “opportune witnesses”
(Hagen, 1993) to make climate change skepticism more prominent. Second, climate skeptics may
gain visibility as objects of reporting. In this role, they are ratied by other actors positively
or negatively. Yet, in both instances, the counter-movement succeeds in gaining visibility in
mainstream debates, which helps turn it into a legitimate actor.
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Table 4.1 shows the dierent dimensions of climate skeptical discourse. To simplify the analytical
framework, we distinguish four core types according to the thematic and positional dimensions.







frames and positions become more
central in the mainstream coverage
Positional resonance: counter-
movement positions become more
central in the mainstream coverage
No
Frame resonance: Counter-movement
frames become more central in the
mainstream coverage
No resonance: Counter-movement
discourse remains marginal in the
mainstream coverage
Table 4.1: Types of discursive resonance.
If frames and positions of counter-movements are mirrored in the coverage of mainstream media,
we speak of full resonance. Pure positional resonance occurs if only the positions of counter-
movements are reported, yet within the mainstream discourse. For climate skeptics, this would, for
example, mean that their skeptical positions receive aention within the larger mainstream debate
about the role of renewable energy in the transition from fossil fuels to a greener society. is
indicator looks for the pure aention of skeptical positions without taking into account whether
journalists counter-argue. However, research points out that visibility maers independent of the
evaluations surrounding it (Ellinas, 2010). By contrast, we speak of pure thematic congruence if the
frames promoted by counter-movements become more prominently part of the relevance structure
of the mainstream debate around climate change without, however, nding a parallel increase in
their positions. Such a seing occurs if climate skeptical frames such as the credibility of scientic
studies, receive aention in mainstream debates, though the skeptical position associated with it
is dismissed. e media would cover the perspective promoted by climate skeptics but explicitly
reject it, arguing for instance that climate science is credible, and scientic results conrm the
trends established by previous research. Finally, if neither skeptical counter-movement frames
nor positions resonate in the media, the counter-movement discourse remains segregated from
the mainstream (Fraser, 1990).
Full, positional and thematic resonance can be further classied according to whether skeptical
actors gain visibility in the coverage and thus are ratied as legitimate participants in the debate.
e more climate skeptical actors become visible together with their position and/or their frames,
the more they succeed in becoming part of the debate on their own terms. Conversely, the less
climate skeptical actors are mentioned in the coverage together with frames and/or positions, the
more the debate is shaped by journalist and other actors such as mainstream politicians.
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4.2 Case selection, data, and methods
4.2.1 Case selection
To study the discursive resonance between the (potentially transnational) online communication
of climate skeptics and traditional media, we focus on Germany. Germany represents an ideal
case as climate skepticism was a small but signicant phenomenon in traditional media (Lörcher
& Taddicken, 2017), parliamentary arenas (Häussler et al., 2016; Schäfer, 2016), and public opinion
(Engels et al., 2013; Tranter & Booth, 2015) during the period of analysis (June 2012 – June 2014).
However, this wide-spread acceptance of man-made climate change does not mean that there was
an equally high level of agreement on political measures. Anyhow, our design allows to search for
initial resonance increase among venues. ereby, research for Germany also shows that climate
skeptics successfully exploit the online world; although fewer in number, climate skeptics are
more visible and more active online and more strongly connect to transnational allies compared
to climate advocates (Adam, Häussler, et al., 2019).
In such a seing, it is possible to observe whether and how ideas from the political counter-
movement may ow into mainstream debates, whereas such ows of ideas are hard to detect in
those countries where climate skeptics are not a minority movement anymore as their ideas are
already visible in all channels. e German seing, thus, may allow us to understand the spread
of ideas, respectively, the conditions under which policy monopolies are destructed (Baumgartner
& Jones, 1993) by redening the issue, by changing the positions formulated, or by changing
the participants of the debate. is is even more interesting as some researchers have claimed
that climate skeptics seem to be gaining aention and terrain in Germany: Brunnengräber (2018)
posited that climate skepticism is increasingly gaining societal acceptance, and Schmid-Petri and
Arlt (2016) show that climate skeptical arguments have slightly increased in mainstream German
media over recent years.
4.2.2 Collecting data on the counter-movements’ communication
To study skeptics’ communication, we studied their online communication—the eld in which
they are most active. Hereby, we relied on hyperlink issue networks that originate from promi-
nent counter-movement actors. We thereby followed the logic of snowball sampling—a method
employed if researchers have limited knowledge about the overall population. Such method
allows to detect also those skeptics that are less-known.
To identify relevant skeptics, we relied on a six-step procedure shown in Fig 4.1. First, we
selected the four most important civil society actors of the climate skeptical counter-movement
in Germany as starting points based on expert interviews, literature reviews, and country-specic
Google searches (with deleted search histories). ese are Analyse+Aktion, EIKE—Europäisches
Institut für Klima und Energie, Klimaskeptiker, and Klimaüberraschung. We chose civil society
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actors as they show the broadest linking behavior (Rogers & Marres, 2000) and because they
are the “champions of online communication” (Schäfer, 2012, p. 530). Second, starting from the
actors’ main climate pages (list of URLs in S1 Appendix, chapter 4.5.1), crawling soware (called
Issuecrawler; see Rogers, 2013) collected all hyperlinks two levels deep within the websites and
all of those that pointed to other websites. We limited our snowball crawling to go only one step
“out” as pre-studies have shown that further crawling substantially increases the number of pages
that do not deal with climate change. ird, to make sure that only pages that were relevant to
the climate debate remained in our network, we indexed all pages according to our keywords
(i.e., “Klimawandel,” “globale Erwärmung,” “globaler Erwärmung,” “globalen Erwärmung”). We
only indexed content that was publicly available, i.e. not password-protected. Also, we respected
the robots exclusion standard (robots.txt). is standard allows website owners to dene areas of
their website that should not be scanned or indexed by robots (e.g. search engines, web crawlers).
In this way, we made sure that the content was permied for download by the website owners.
Figure 4.1: Online sampling procedure.
Fourth, some data preparation was necessary. We aggregated single web pages and domains that
belonged to the same actors. is allowed us, in a h step, to aribute a position on climate
change and a type of actor to each of the identied actors. To do so, we applied a manual content
analysis, based on information found on the “About us” pages or similar sections of the website
and conducted by two trained coders. ey distinguished, position-wise, between climate skeptics,
climate advocates, and climate neutrals (with no clear-cut position); separated legacy media from
other actors; and coded their scope/country of activity (distinguishing a total of 199 geographical
areas). Note that according to our denition, a climate skeptic is someone who explicitly questions
at least one of the following: the existence of climate change, the human contribution to it, the
science of climate change and/or its ndings, projected trends/consequences of climate change,
and/or the adaptation to it. By this denition, a climate skeptic is also someone who endorses
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the science but negates, for instance, its political and economic consequences. In turn, a climate
advocate explicitly supports at least one of these points without doubting any of the others. e
actors’ aributes were classied by two trained coders. e reliability of their classication was
assessed by comparing them with a master coding and was calculated using Krippendor’s alpha,
which is a common statistical measure of the agreement between dierent coders when coding
the same texts. e agreement is usually measured on the level of individual variables. e test
revealed satisfactory results with Krippendor’s Alpha of .90 for the position variable, .90 for
the actor type variable, and .93 for the scope variable. In the nal step, only those actors and
their communication that put forward climate skeptical positions and were not rated as legacy
media remained in our sample, which serves as a proxy for climate skeptics’ communication (154
dierent actors with a total of 13,009 unique web pages). Climate skeptics’ online communication
here originates from prominent German climate skeptics from civil society, but then it is extended
by snowball sampling to include text material from all types of skeptical non-legacy-media actors.
As shown in Table 4.2, however, non-prot civil society actors and individual private persons
account for the vast majority of the web pages in the nal sample. Out of the 154 dierent actors,
33 are domestic actors from Germany with a primarily national scope, and 121 are foreign actors
(either with a foreign national or transnational scope).
Actors Webpages
Domicile German actors 33 3,549Foreign actors 121 9,490
Type
Politicians, political actors 3 3
Socioeconomic pressure groups, companies 4 33
Non-prot civil society actors 45 3,779
Genuine online media 26 216
Citizens / private persons 74 8,977
Other actors 2 12
Total 154 13,009
Table 4.2: Key gures of the skeptics’ online sample.
We collected such online communication data of climate skeptics once a month over a period
of two years (2012–14). We are aware that this proxy captures only part of climate skeptics’
communication, omiing, for example, online communication via social media (e.g., Gerlitz &
Helmond, 2013). However, as actors are active on all venues and as research has shown that
hyperlinking, i.e. referring to another actor by linking to its web presence, is closely related to
social media and the interactions there (Fu & Shumate, 2017), we are condent that such a partial
approach might capture the relevant content of skeptics’ online communication (see for a similar
argument, Benkler, Roberts, Faris, Solow-Niederman, & Etling, 2015).
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4.2.3 Collecting data on mainstream debates in traditional media
We regard the national print media landscape (whether online or oine) as a good proxy for the
mainstream debate. Research has shown that mass media have an elitist focus (Benne, 1990;
Wolfsfeld, 1997) and, as such, are likely to reect the mainstream debate. For Germany, we have
selected the 15 most important daily and weekly newspapers as well as magazines with a national
audience reach (see S2 Appendix, chapter 4.5.2). All of these outlets are regarded as national
opinion-leaders. Within these outlets, we identied all relevant articles on climate change by
searching for the above-mentioned keywords in the databases of Factiva and LexisNexis. is
resulted in 4,111 articles about climate change in the observed period in German legacy media.
To nd out whether discourse resonance is especially strong as regards the conservative media
landscape, we nally classied the newspapers and magazines in our sample according to their
ideological position. Following the work of Beck (2018, pp. 153-155), Begenat (2016, pp. 98-99),
Lüter (2004), Maurer and Reinemann (2006, pp. 129-130), Pew Research Center (2018), Schwarz-
Friesel (2013, p. 52), and Wessler and Rinke (2013, p. 640), we identied the following nine legacy
media as right of the center: Bild, Bild am Sonntag, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, FAZ
am Sonntag, Financial Times Deutschland, Focus, Handelsbla, and Welt am Sonntag. As shown in
Table 4.3, they account for 1,495 articles in our sample (see S2 Appendix, chapter 4.5.2 for exact
number for each outlet). However, it is important to note that unlike in other countries (e.g., Great
Britain), there are no hard right-wing newspapers in Germany, as even the most pronounced
right-leaning paper (i.e., Die Welt) mostly adheres to liberal-pluralist principles (Beck, 2018).
Outlets Articles
Type Conservative media 9 1,495Other media 6 2,616
Total 15 4,111
Table 4.3: Key gures of the oine sample.
e raw data collected from legacy media as well as from the counter-movements’ online commu-
nication is available to all interested researchers upon request via the open repository of GESIS
(hps://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.5183). e R code produced for the data collection as well as for the
analyses is publicly available on GitHub (hps://github.com/ikmb-unibe/coab so2).
4.2.4 Measuring discursive resonance
Our analysis is based on digital text on climate change of the skeptical counter-movement (online)
and of legacy media (oine) over the course of two years. We aggregated the data on the level of
single months and examined the discursive resonance. We acknowledge that this approach only
captures the monthly correlation of the agendas and we therefore make no claims as to any strict
causal relationships between counter- and mainstream-arenas. However, a more detailed look
reveals whether discursive resonance pushes skeptics’ frames, positions and actors or those of
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the mainstream. Of course, such paerns of increased discursive resonance may well be caused
by third, unobserved factors, which play an important role in creating opportunities of discursive
resonance. Such factors are hard to nd in the continuous analysis whereas it is one strength of
our qualitative case studies that such factors are detected.
To reveal the general trends, we employ a correlation approach on the aggregate level of the
data, examining discursive resonance between counter-movement discourse and media coverage
month by month. For single critical instances of heightened resonance, in turn, we take a more
qualitative close-up view that is able to reveal some of the reasons behind the sudden changes




































Identication of critical moments based on
quantitative indicators, followed by an in-depth study
of the factors triggering such discursive resonance.
Table 4.4: Methods and techniques used to measure discursive resonance.
To conduct this analysis, we employed a variety of computational methods. We used a bag-of-
words topic model to detect shis in the framing competition, employed a purpose-trained classier
algorithm to distinguish positions on climate change, and relied on a semi-automated named
entity recognition procedure to show which actors participated in the debate. In the following
paragraphs, we will shortly introduce each of these methods.
To identify frames, we relied on probabilistic topic modeling (Blei, 2012), an unsupervised method
of automated content analysis (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013), that helps unravel latent or hidden
thematic structures of text material using Bayesian statistics. Topic models are mixed-membership
models, meaning that every document consists of a mixture of dierent topics. Each document
can therefore be understood as probability distribution over a set of topics and is best described by
those topics with the highest probabilities. A topic, on the other hand, is dened by a “probability
distribution over the entire corpus’ vocabulary” (Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Wiedemann, et al.,
2018, p. 97) and represents a latent paern of word (co-)occurrences. ose words that have a
high probability within a topic are the ones that dene it thematically.
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In order to become meaningful, topics must be interpreted in a qualitative process and against
the backdrop of a theory. Depending on both the corpus and the theory, the resulting thematic
structures (i.e., probability distribution over words) may either be interpreted as actual topics (e.g.,
environment versus economy), as issues (e.g., climate change), or as frames (e.g., the emphasis on
the scientic consensus), depending on the underlying type of text corpus (Jacobi et al., 2016). As
explained before, we understand frames as “central organizing idea[s] or story line[s]” (Gamson
& Modigliani, 1987, p. 143) that represent the “particular ways [in which] issues are presented”
(Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 184). In combination with the fact that we have keyword-cleaned
texts, all dealing with climate change, and thus a relatively coherent corpus, we consider it valid
to interpret the resulting latent paerns of word (co-)occurrences as frames or interpretative
packages (see also DiMaggio, Nag, & Blei, 2013).
For our analysis, we rely on the commonly used and well documented structural topic model
framework (STM; Roberts et al., 2016, 2013). As we removed duplicate web pages to compute our
STM, it is based on a total of 17,120 text documents. is was done to avoid a bias in favour of the
duplicated documents. As topic models only work with monolingual text material, we translated
all the vocabulary of the English web pages into German before calculating the model (Reber,
2019). We applied several common preprocessing steps in order to extract as much information
from the corpus as possible. is included the removal of punctuation, conversion to all lowercase,
removal of words with less than three characters, removal of stop words (e.g., “und”, “oder”,
“auf”, “der”), stemming, and the removal of words that appear in less than 0.5% and in more than
99% of all documents (relative pruning). To decide on the number of topics (K), we combined
data-driven indicators with a qualitative assessment of the interpretability of dierent solutions
(Maier, Waldherr, Miltner, Wiedemann, et al., 2018). To do so, we rst calculated 8 models with 5
to 40 topics. We then compared these models based on standard measures (i.e., held-out likelihood,
semantic coherence, residuals). e models with 20 and 30 topics were selected for the nal
interpretation step. Based on both the topic top words and particularly relevant documents,
the topics were interpreted by two people. e guiding question was whether top words and
documents represent an interpretable and coherent frame. If both persons came to the same
conclusion, the topic was labelled, otherwise it was excluded from the analysis. In the end, we
chose the model with 20 topics, whereby ve uninterpretable topics were excluded and two
similar topics were merged (all labels and top words are shown in S3 Appendix, chapter 4.5.3).
e calculation was done in R using the stm package (Roberts et al., 2017).
To compare the similarity of frames used by climate skeptics in their online communication and
in mass media reporting, we relied on the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD). is is a smoothed
and symmetric derivative of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, which is a common measure
when comparing distributions (Niekler & Jähnichen, 2012). e normalized outcomes of the JSD
can be used as measure of similarity between two probability distributions and is therefore well
suited for the comparison of the topic distributions of our online and oine samples. A JSD of
0 would indicate complete congruence of two distributions (i.e., the same frames used by the
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climate change skeptics and the legacy media). A JSD of 1 would mean completely dierent
distributions and thus completely dierent frames. If climate skeptics succeed in inuencing the
thematic relevance structure of legacy media in a continuous way, we would therefore expect a
declining JSD over the course of our two-year period of analysis. We use ordinary least square
regression to test whether the potential trend is signicant.
To identify positions, we relied on a trained classier algorithm, or, more precisely, on a linear
support vector machine (Joachims, 1998). is classier algorithm was used to categorize each
single sentence in our documents as either advocate-leaning, skeptical-leaning, or irrelevant. In
contrast to topic modeling, a classier follows the logic of automated supervised content analyses
(Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). is means that it follows the logic of a pre-dened coding scheme. In
a rst step, this coding scheme guides a manual content analysis of a text sample, distinguishing
skeptical from advocative sentences. In a second step, the manually coded material serves as
learning material for the computer algorithm (Scharkow, 2013). To account for the two languages
in our data set we trained two models, one for English documents and one for German documents.
To train the models, we used an active learning scenario. is means that we trained and checked
the two models in several iterations, using manually coded sentences as training material and
benchmark. e initial training set consisted of sentences from advocates and skeptics as well as
of sentences that have nothing to do with climate change. e inclusion of such random sentences
is crucial in order to be able to detect also irrelevant sentences in the data set. is initial training
sets were used to train a rst model for each language that was then applied to 10’000 random
uncategorized sentences of our corpus in the respective language. Aer this rst classication,
the result was evaluated by a team of three human coders. e evaluated sentences were then
added to the initial training data and the models were trained once again (hyperparameter C
optimized by cross validation to avoid overing). We repeated this process three times, until we
could not improve the classiers’ performance anymore (measured by k-fold cross validation). To
measure the accuracy of the classiers, we treated the manually coded sentences as gold standard
and compared them with the machine coded sentences. Aer the third iteration, the overall
accuracy measured by the harmonic mean of precision and recall (micro-average) was F1 = 0.83
for the English model and F1 = 0.85 for the German model (see S4 Appendix, chapter 4.5.4 for
macro-average F1 of dierent categories). ese are satisfying accuracy values. Classication
was done in R using the LibLineaR package (Fan, Chang, Hsieh, Wang, & Lin, 2008).
To assess the discursive resonance as regards positions, we analyzed whether the increase in
skeptical sentences online is correlated with the share of skeptical sentences in the media. To
do so, we rst compare the share of skeptical sentences online and oine and study whether
the dierences of these shares increases or decreases. To detect potential trends, we use linear
regression models.
Finally, to identify skeptical actors within the debate, we relied on named-entity recognition (NER).
It is a set of procedures to extract categories, like people’s names, organizations, and locations,
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from unstructured texts (for a short description, see Scharkow, 2013). To identify all actors in our
sample of climate change web pages and media articles, we rst used a list of around 1.3 million
known named-entities as a look-up list (a lexical approach). On the one hand, the list consisted
of names of prominent individuals (e.g., “Angela Merkel”) and multi-word units (e.g., “market
economy”) that were not necessarily related to the climate change issue. On the other hand, it
contained 10,095 names of actors that we had identied as important for the public discourse on
climate change using manual content analysis (Schmid-Petri et al., 2013). In order to identify actors
who were not on the list, we used two probabilistic sequence classiers (English and German),
which we trained specically for this purpose using the list. We used conditional random eld
models from the Stanford CoreNLP package (Finkel et al., 2005) as classier algorithms.
To show discursive resonance as regards debates’ participants, we needed to add information to
the named entities extracted. us, we relied on the list of 10,095 manually coded actors. For
each actor, we coded the position on climate change—more precisely, whether the actor thinks
that climate change is occurring and whether he/she sees it as a problem. is allowed us to
identify the most important climate skeptics in our corpus. Using Kripendor’s alpha again, the
reliability scores were 0.69 for the rst variable (occurrence of climate change) and 0.75 for the
second (climate change seen as problem). is was measured as master-coder reliability based on
a random sample of 30 actors. Both manually coded variables achieved satisfactory reliability
scores.
Using these procedures, we identied a total of 46,901 skeptical actors, 443,452 advocative actors,
and 411,955 actors without a clear position on climate change in our corpus. As before, we
analyzed whether an increase in mentions of skeptical actors online was associated with an
increase in mentions in the media. Again, we rst compare the shares of skeptical actors used by
both the skeptics and the legacy media. We then use the dierence of the shares as divergence
measure. Simple linear regression models are used to check for a signicant convergence or
divergence respectively.
Finally, we used a qualitative approach to identify selective resonance. In a rst step, we identied
critical moments in the time series. ese are moments when the frames found online and oine
were more similar than usual, when there were an increase of skeptical sentences in the media
coverage, or when an unusual number of skeptical actors were mentioned in oine reporting.
We then searched for documents that showed the characteristic paerns. A thorough reading of
these documents nally allowed us to identify and describe the factors for discursive resonance
and put them into the wider context of legacy media coverage on climate change.
4.3 Results
As a basis for our further analysis of the three indicators for discursive resonance, we rst looked
at the salience of climate change in legacy media (Fig 4.2 A)—a prerequisite to study the resonance
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of dierent venues in this issue. Fig 4.2 A clearly shows that legacy media reported frequently on
climate change. However, thereby two observations are worth mentioning: rst, conservative
media are responsible for only a third of the articles in our sample (although they constitute more
than half of our sample). e other two thirds of the articles on climate change are published by
le-leaning media and media without a clear political prole (hereinaer referred to as “other
media”). Second, the volume of reporting on climate change decreased in both media categories
over the course of the two years analyzed.
Figure 4.2: Salience of climate change (A) and resonance measures (B-F).
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4.3.1 Continuous resonance
Frame resonance: We speak of a continuous frame resonance if the JSD becomes signicantly
smaller in the two-year period. is would indicate a convergence of online and oine agendas.
However, the regression models reported in Table 4.5 show that there was no signicant decrease
of the JSD for both conservative and other legacy media. As the coecients indicate, the distance
between online and oine agendas remain almost the same over the whole time period. erefore,
neither of the two legacy media types can be aributed a continuous thematic resonance.
ematic resonance Positional resonance Actor resonance























Table 4.5: Regression coecients β for resonance measures.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1
Beyond, a comparison between conservative and other media reveals that there is no indication
that conservative media are more open for the skeptics’ frames. In contrast Fig 4.2 B even
indicates that the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) between the aggregated online and oine
frame agendas is slightly bigger for conservative media than for other media. is means that
the climate change framing in le-leaning media and media without a clear political prole is,
overall, closer to that of the climate change skeptics on the web compared to that of conservative
newspapers and magazines which clearly contradicts the expectations about the special role of
right-wing media in giving voice to climate skeptics as regards frames.
Positional resonance: With regard to positional resonance, Fig 4.2 C shows that climate change
skeptics became more radical over time. However, the degree of verbal radicalization is marginal
(β = 0.0005) and only weakly signicant (p = 0.0687). Nevertheless, every tenth sentence on
an average skeptic’s website explicitly expresses a skeptical position on climate change. e
traditional media, however, remain unaected by this development. e proportion of skeptical
sentences is almost identical for both the legacy media categories and remains low over the entire
time period. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the divergence (Fig 4.2 D) between online and
oine increases. In case of the conservative media, the increase (β = 0.0005, se = 0.0003) is
even weakly signicant (p = 0.0904). Despite their radicalization, the climate change skeptics
have therefore not succeeded in provoking a continuous resonance regards their positions.
Resonance as regards participants of a debate: As shown in Fig 4.2 E and 4.2 F, no resonance can be
shown as regards participants. Legacy media hardly give skeptical actors a platform, regardless
of the media’s political prole. Moreover, there is also no visible convergence. e dierence
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remains similar for both conservative and all other media over the whole two years. us, there
are no obvious continuous resonance eects here either.
Overall, no continuous discursive resonance can be identied. ere is no evidence that German
legacy media are increasingly following climate skeptics over the course of time. Interestingly,
hardly any dierence is found between conservative and other legacy media as regards frames,
positions and actors, with some counter-intuitive exceptions as regards the framing of the issue.
For the German conservative media, we can therefore not conrm what has been shown for their
US counterparts—that conservative media in general are allies to climate change skeptics. German
legacy media do not seem to oer a platform for climate change skeptics.
e lack of continuous resonance between legacy media and climate skeptics in Germany as
regards frames, positions and actors, results in a debate that is fragmented. On a thematic dimen-
sion, this fragmentation becomes visible in Fig 4.3. It makes clear that German legacy media frame
the issue of climate change almost exclusively in terms of the German economy/consumption
paerns. is one frame captures most of the mainstream debate, whereas climate skeptics employ
a variety of frames with “doubting the climate science consensus,” “climate science skepticism,”
and “measuring climate change” being the most prominent. On a positional dimension, this
fragmentation is shown in the radicalization of climate skeptics’ communication that is not at all
reected in mainstream debate (Fig 4.2 C, 4.2 D). In sum, climate skeptics still form a separated
counter public in Germany in the time of analysis, that is occupied with its own frames, radicalizes
its positions and is not taking-over the economy frame dominating the mainstream debate. e
mainstream public, in contrast, is occupied with discussing the economic consequences of climate
change while largely ignoring the skeptics’ frames, positions and actors.
Figure 4.3: Mean topic proportions in legacy media and on websites of climate skeptics.
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4.3.2 Selective resonance
Does this, however, mean that German legacy media are immune to climate skeptics’ frames,
positions, and allies, or do we nd indicators of selective resonance among the dierent venues?
Our data indicate that, in September 2013, a selective resonance might have occurred. In this
month, the Jensen-Shannon divergence was noticeably low, which indicates a thematic resonance
(Fig 4.2 B). Hereby, the frame, “climate science skepticism,” peaked in the legacy media, reducing
the aention on the dominating frame as regards the German economy, both in the conservative
as well as in the other legacy media. is thematic resonance was accompanied by an above
average share of skeptical sentences in the legacy media (Fig 4.2 C).
Looking at the articles that have both a high probability of the “climate science skepticism” frame
and a high proportion of skeptical sentences, it can be seen that their publication was triggered by
two events: the publication of the nal dra of the 5th assessment report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the publication of an oceanographic study in the journal
Nature. While the assessment report contains some more conservative projections than previous
versions, the Nature study (Kosaka & Xie, 2013) addresses the lower than predicted temperature
increases in recent decades. Both aspects—the IPCC’s supposed failure/fraud and the plateau in
the temperature curve—can be regarded as critical events, changing visibility structures within
the climate change debates. e skeptics have successfully used these events to put forward their
alleged counter-evidence for climate change referring to the news value “surprise”.
ese scientic publications have opened up a window of opportunity for skeptics’ frames and
positions to reach out to legacy media’s agenda. A closed-up reading of the relevant articles,
however, shows that such punctual visibility of skeptics’ frames and positions in the legacy media
have been opposed by the journalists themselves: they criticize skeptics’ interpretations and, thus,
accompany this selective resonance with their own critical examination of skeptics’ arguments.
4.4 Discussion
In this article, we examined how dierent venues—the online venue of climate change skeptics and
the mainstream discourse—resonate. Given that counter-movements are by denition oriented
towards the mainstream of political debates (Fraser, 1990), this paper has investigated the opposite
relationship, more challenging from the point of view of democratic theory: do the online
counter-movements of climate skeptics resonate in traditional media? We have studied three
types of discursive resonance: the media’s adoption of climate change skeptics’ frames (thematic
resonance), the inclusion of skeptical positions (positional resonance), and the mentioning of
skeptical actors (actor resonance). In addition to this, we have distinguished continuous from
selective resonance paerns.
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As a rst major result of our study, we nd no evidence for continuous resonance. We nd
neither an increase of skeptical frames in the legacy media’s coverage, nor an increase of skeptical
positions or actors. Second, however, this does not mean that skeptical voice are invisible in
traditional media, as resonance may occur only selectively at single points in time. Our data reveal
that specic events—in our case, the publication of scientic reports—can open a small window
of opportunity that sees skeptical frames resonate to a greater degree in the media. While even in
these cases skeptical positions remain contested by the media, their mere inclusion serves to ratify
their views as legitimate contributions to the debate. is can be seen by counter-movements as a
rst step towards greater possibilities of participation in political debates.
ird, the ideological prole of newspapers and magazines in Germany did not turn out to
be relevant: Conservative legacy media in Germany did not give greater resonance to climate
skeptical voices. is strongly contrasts with the US, where conservative outlets play an important
role in amplifying climate skepticism and are part of the “climate change denial machine” (Dunlap
& McCright, 2011, p. 147). is nding also underlines the necessity to move research beyond
the US context to beer understand the role played by dierent context factors. In Germany, for
example, the landscape of traditional media is substantially less polarized than in the US, and –
contra the two component theory—journalists across the political spectrum appear to display
no dierence in their orientation towards news factors. However, while there is no qualitative
dierence between media outlets in terms of news factor emphasis, there is a telling quantitative
distinction between them: while our sample includes more conservative than centrist or le-
leaning media, climate change is much less salient in them. Lacking established skeptical actors
on the national stage they could use as opportune witnesses in their reporting, conservative media
resort to downplaying the issue by allocating less space to it.
How can we explain the lack of continuous resonance in the German case? News value theory
hints at three factors (e.g., Schulz, 1976). First, the network of German climate change skeptics
is rather weak. Most of the web pages in the sample are from foreign actors, in particular from
the United States, and included in the German issue network by German skeptics. However, but
neither the scope nor the language of these actors is necessarily German, and, as such, they are no
points of reference for journalists, whose reporting is primarily oriented towards domestic politics.
In news value terminology, they lack both the “closeness” and the “prestige”. Second, German
skeptics lack prominent speakers, whose status would guarantee continuous resonance. ird,
the climate skeptical discourse is largely uncoupled from the policy cycle and its coverage by the
media. Whereas news outlets followed the political that revolved around the economic aspects
of climate change, skeptics discussed unrelated, more fundamental questions (e.g., whether it
occurs or whether one can trust climate scientists), which did not t into the relevance structure
of news reporting. is leaves few options for climate skeptics and their resonance opportunities
are mostly selective: without prestigious actors and disengaged from the policy cycle, they rely
on event-driven news factors. e “surprise” news factor becomes an important element, and
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our study shows that skeptics rely on external events like the publication of scientic reports
that—from a mainstream perspective—reveal surprising ndings.
Our results point out that German legacy media have not played a prominent role in spreading
the ideas of climate skeptics. On the contrary, they seemed to fulll their task of informing the
public about climate change in accordance with the scientic consensus (e.g., Oreskes, 2004), and
criticized the climate skeptical positions on which they reported, as our qualitative case study
shows. While this conforms to the normative standards associated with journalism, the media
largely reduced their climate change coverage to the economic aspect, neglecting its political
dimension or its international scope. is one-sided focus may hamper the ability to act politically
and actually solve the climate crisis.
Moreover, the media’s exclusionary practice towards the skeptical counter-movement has its
drawbacks: those supporting the counter-positions might well develop a feeling of alienation and
misrepresentation. As a consequence, these people may turn to alternative digital information
sources, while their distrust of traditional media increases—a trend that has occurred in recent
years in Germany on the political far-right. e media’s decision to refrain for instance from
questioning the scientic consensus might well result in losing their role as legitimate gatekeepers
in the debate in the eyes of some parts of the population.
Do our results mean that the engagement of counter-movements’ online has no eect? Although
skeptics lack a continuous resonance on legacy media agendas, they still have a selective one.
Counter-movements’ online communication serves as a “reservoir of ideas” from which they can
draw as soon as a window of opportunity opens (Adam, Schmid-Petri, et al., 2019). However,
further research needs to show whether counter-movements’ online communication fullls more
functions. It might be that climate skeptical ideas and positions are disseminated without the
help of traditional media. is raises the question of diusion paerns of climate skepticism and
the role played by traditional media, digital outlets, blogs and social media—and how they dier
between countries. And depending on the national context, can skeptics bypass the media and
directly inuence politics and, in this way, gain legitimacy and a wider access to citizens?
Beyond this, future research needs to dig deeper into the conditions under which media resonance
occurs. To further understand continuous resonance and the relevance of the news factor “promi-
nence/elite,” Germany would certainly be an interesting case. Here, the recent electoral gains
of the right-wing “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) have also brought some climate change
skeptics into parliament, which in turn might help skeptical voices to become more prominent
in traditional media. In addition, more research is needed to understand which specic types of
events and conditions make selective resonance more likely. In our research, climate skeptics
have relied on external events to promote their ideas. However, can counter-movements create
events themselves to advance their agenda (see Staggenborg, 1993)? Knowledge about these
events and conditions might help make journalists more sensitive in their reporting. Finally,
more comparative research is needed to gain a beer understanding of digital discourse strategies
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employed by climate skeptics and their resonance in media coverage. Our study already shows
that the paerns we observe in Germany are not comparable to the ones in the US. We thus need
to systematically study context factors.
Finally, there are a number of limitations that we need to address: First, we speak of the resonance
of climate skeptical discourse in the media. Statistically, this corresponds to correlations models
and we are aware that we cannot draw conclusions about causal relationships in a strict sense.
Particularly with regard to frames, it might be climate skeptics whose discourse is inuenced
by the mainstream debate covered by the media. Second, empirically, the distinction between
frames and positions is not as clear as presented by the theory. Frames dene the relevance
structure of an issue, regardless of the position of the actors. However, the results of our topic
model suggest that some frames are aligned with a specic position (e.g., the denial of weather
consequences reects the skeptical position). At the same time, none of the frames is solely used
by one side of the debate (Adam, Schmid-Petri, et al., 2019), and we are condent that our analysis
captures the three crucial components of political debates: frames, positions, and actors. ird,
our named-entity approach did not allow us to distinguish between speakers and addressees.
However, this distinction is important to assess the role of the actors in the media reports. Beyond
this, the automated approaches failed to reveal how journalists reacted to an increase in skeptical
frames and positions. Here, only a qualitative case study can show journalists’ critical reactions.
To this end, additional methodological work is needed.
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4.5 Supporting information
4.5.1 S1 Appendix: Starting points for the snowball-sampling of websites
Actor Start URL
Analyse+Aktion hp://astrologieklassisch.wordpress.com/tag/klimawandel





Table 4.6: Starting points for the snowball-sampling of websites.
4.5.2 S2 Appendix: List of German legacy media
Newspaper/magazine Conservative Number of articles
Bild x 33
Bild am Sonntag x 15
Der Spiegel 88
Die Welt x 347
Die Zeit 175
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung x 622
FAZ am Sonntag x 101






Taz, die Tageszeitung 622
Welt am Sonntag x 112
Table 4.7: List of German legacy media.
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4.5.3 S3 Appendix: Topic labels and top words
Label Top words
Climate science conspiracy wissenscha, klima, unterlag, herzland, wissenschal, institut, peer, arbeit, mensch, falsch
Climate science conspiracy e-mail, freitas, papier-, wissenscha, mann, klima, mannscha, versuch, sorg, geschicht
Climate science skepticisim prof, jahr, bi, ipcc, co2, wissenscha, global, klimawandel, klima, erwarm
Climategate wissenscha, tagebuch, freitas, aktion, papi, hinweis, rezension, klima, phil, person
Denial of weather consequences klima, co2, ansteig, erhohen,, verander, erwarm, global, mensch, wissenscha, we
Doubting climate science consensus klima, wissenscha, global, erwarm, verander, ipcc, wissenschal, bericht, polit, forschung
Energy production energi, wind, leistung, vereinigt, regier, polit, land, wirtscha, europa, kost
Environmental regulations panz, kohlensto, mensch, kohl, umwelt, epa, jahr, emission, welt, zustand
Environmentalism mensch, natur, bericht, vereinigt, klima, konigreich, umgeb, leb, beispiel, auswirk
German economy/consumption jahr, deutsch, klimawandel, deutschland, gross, prozent, land, energiew, europa, hoh
Greenhouse gas eect atmosphar, temperatur, co2, oberach, erhoht, strahlung, erd, energi, lu, ansteig
Measuring climate change zeigt, temperatur, dat, jahr, erwarm, modell, bedeut, global, trend, zahl
Solar activity solar, klima, sonn, erd, zyklus, aktivitat, wolk, kosmisch, strahl, planet
Supression of climate change dissent wissenscha, klima, seeland, aufzeichn, temperatur, niwa, verander, position, bemerk, deba
Trend skepticism jahr, eis, erhebt, meer, ansteig, erhohen, global, erwarm, we, temperatur
Table 4.8: Topic labels and top words.
4.5.4 S4 Appendix: Performance indicators for the semi-automated classier
Macro F1 Micro F1
Language Skeptics Advocate irrelevant/neutral overall
English 0.62 0.68 0.91 0.82
German 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.85
Table 4.9: Performance indicators for the semi-automated classier.
Reported are the F1 scores (harmonic average of precision and recall; macro F1 for the dierent
categories and micro F1 overall) aer the third iteration of active learning. e scores are calculated
by comparing the machine coding against the manual coding (gold standard).
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Begenat, M. (2016). Öentlichkeit – für alle? emen und Informationsrepertoires in politischen
Milieus. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-11286-8
Benkler, Y. (2006). e wealth of networks: How social production transforms markets and freedom.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Benkler, Y., Roberts, H., Faris, R., Solow-Niederman, A., & Etling, B. (2015). Social mobilization
and the networked public sphere: Mapping the SOPA-PIPA debate. Political
Communication, 32(4), 594-624. doi: 0.1080/10584609.2014.986349
Benne, W. L. (1990). Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United-States. Journal of
Communication, 40(2), 103-125. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1990.tb02265.x
Benne, W. L., Lang, S., & Segerberg, A. (2015). European issue publics online: e cases of
climate change and fair trade. In T. Risse (Ed.), European public spheres: Politics is back
(p. 108-137). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Benoit, K., Schwarz, D., & Traber, D. (2012, June). e sincerity of political speech in parliamentary
systems: A comparison of ideal points scaling using legislative speech and votes. Paper
presented at the second annual conference of the European Political Science Association
(EPSA), Berlin. Retrieved from hp://www.dschwarz.ch/downloads/
EPSA 2012 BenoitSchwarzTraber.pdf?aredirects=0
Benoit, K., Watanabe, K., Nulty, P., Obeng, A., Wang, H., Lauderdale, B., & Lowe, W. (2017).
quanteda: antitative analysis of textual data [Computer soware]. Retrieved from
hp://quanteda.io
Blei, D. M. (2012). Probabilistic topic models. Communications of the ACM , 55(4), 77-84. doi:
10.1145/2133806.2133826
Blei, D. M., Ng, A. Y., & Jordan, M. I. (2003). Latent dirichlet allocation. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 3(4/5), 993-1022. Retrieved from
hp://jmlr.csail.mit.edu/papers/v3/blei03a.html
Boumans, J. W., & Trilling, D. (2016). Taking stock of the toolkit: An overview of relevant
automated content analysis approaches and techniques for digital journalism scholars.
Digital Journalism, 4(1), 8-23. doi: 10.1080/21670811.2015.1096598
Boussalis, C., & Coan, T. G. (2016). Text-mining the signals of climate change doubt. Global
Environmental Change, 36, 89-100. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.12.001
Boyko, M. T., & Boyko, J. M. (2004). Balance as bias: Global warming and the US prestige
press. Global Environmental Change, 14, 125-136. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2003.10.001
Brin, S., & Page, L. (1998, April). e anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search engine.
Paper presented at the seventh International World-Wide Web Conference. Retrieved from
hp://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/361/
76
Broadbent, J., Sonne, J., Botetzagias, I., Carson, M., Carvalho, A., Chien, Y.-J., . . . Zhengyi, S.
(2016). Conicting climate change frames in a global eld of media discourse. Socius, 2,
1-17. doi: 10.1177/2378023116670660
Brulle, R. (2014). Institutionalizing delay: Foundation funding and the creation of U.S. climate
change counter-movement organizations. Climatic Change, 122(4), 681-694. doi:
10.1007/s10584-013-1018-7
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González-Bailón, S. (2009). Opening the black box of link formation: Social factors underlying
the structure of the Web. Social Networks, 31(4), 271-280. doi: 10.1016/j.socnet.2009.07.003
Grimmer, J., & Stewart, B. M. (2013). Text as data: e promise and pitfalls of automatic content
analysis methods for political texts. Political Analysis, 21(3), 267-297. doi:
10.1093/pan/mps028
Grundmann, R., & Sco, M. (2014). Disputed climate science in the media: Do countries maer?
Public Understanding of Science, 23(2), 220-235. doi: 10.1177/0963662512467732
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Staggenborg, S. (1993). Critical events and the mobilization of the pro-choice movement.
Research in Political Sociology, 6(1), 319-345.
Stein, L. (2009). Social movement web use in theory and practice: A content analysis of US
movement websites. New Media & Society, 11(5), 749-771. doi: 10.1177/1461444809105350
Taddy, M. A. (2012). On estimation and selection for topic models. In Proceedings of the 15th
International Conference on Articial Intelligence and Statistics. Retrieved from
hp://proceedings.mlr.press/v22/taddy12/taddy12.pdf
Takhteyev, Y., Gruzd, A., & Wellman, B. (2012). Geography of Twier networks. Social Networks,
34(1), 73-81.
Tesler, M. (2017). Elite domination of public doubts about climate change (not evolution).
Political Communication, 35(2), 306-326. doi: 10.1080/10584609.2017.1380092
Tranter, B., & Booth, K. (2015). Scepticism in a changing climate: A cross-national study. Global
Environmental Change, 33, 154-164. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.05.003
UNFCCC. (1992, May). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Retrieved from
hp://unfccc.int/les/essential background/background publications htmlpdf/
application/pdf/conveng.pdf
UNFCCC. (2009, December). Copenhagen Accord. Retrieved from
hps://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf
UNFCCC. (2015, December). Paris Agreement. Retrieved from
hps://unfccc.int/sites/default/les/english paris agreement.pdf
Van Rensburg, W. (2015). Climate change scepticism: A conceptual re-evaluation. SAGE Open,
5(2), 1-13. doi: 10.1177/2158244015579723
87
Volkmer, I. (2019). e transnationalization of public spheres and global policy. In D. Stone &
K. Moloney (Eds.), e Oxford handbook of global policy and transnational administration.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198758648.013.43
Vu, H. T., Liu, Y., & Tran, D. V. (2019). Nationalizing a globel phenomenon: A study of how the
press in 45 countries and territories portrays climate change. Global Environmental Change,
58, 1-9. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.101942
Waldherr, A., Maier, D., Miltner, P., & Günther, E. (2017). Big data, big noise: e challenge of
nding issue networks on the web. Social Science Computer Review, 35(4), 427-443. doi:
10.1177/0894439316643050
Wallach, H., Murray, I., Salakhutdinov, R., & Mimno, D. (2009). Evaluation methods for topic
models. In Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on machine learning
(p. 1105-1112). Retrieved from hp://dirichlet.net/pdf/wallach09evaluation.pdf
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